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CONTEXTS AND CONTENTS OF "FOR GOOD
CAUSE" AS CRITERION FOR REMOVAL
OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES:
LEGAL AND POLICY FACTORS
VICTOR

I.

G.

ROSENBLUM·

INTRODUCTION

Push has been coming to shove recently in sectors of relation
ships between administrative law judges and employing agencies,
with conflicts at the Social Security Administration in the visible
forefront. The lure and trauma of battle over the power of agencies
to prescribe and sanction methodologies and outputs for administra
tive law judges have left in limbo implementation of earlier consen
sus-oriented proposals for incremental improvements in selection
and monitoring of the judges l and have, instead, placed priorities on
• Professor of Law and Political Science, Northwestern University School of Law;
A.B., Columbia University, 1945; LL.B., Columbia University School of Law, 1948;
Ph.D., University of California at Berkeley, 1953; D.H.L. (Honorary) Hebrew Union
College, 1970. Chairman, Administrative Law Section of the American Bar Association,
1977-78. Member, Executive Committee of the American Judicature Society; Associa
tion of American Law Schools.
This article was originally prepared for the Administrative Conference of the United
States. It represents only the views of the author and not necessarily those of the Confer
ence. The author was Washington and Lee University's Frances Lewis Scholar in resi
dence while researching and drafting this article and deeply appreciates the limitless
collegial generosity given him.
I. Two fine studies bearing on selection of administrative law judges were con
ducted by Amiel T. Sharon for the Examination Services Branch of the U.S. Office of
Personnel Management's Personnel Research and Development Center and published by
OPM in 1980 without commentary or implementation. Sharon, An Investigation ofRefer
ence Ratings for Applicants for Administrative Law Judge (PRR 80-6) (1980); Sharon,
Validation of tlte Administrative Law Judge Examination (PRR 80-15) (1980) (available
from Office of Personnel Management, Wash., D.C.).
The LaMacchia Committee's study a decade ago of opinions and beliefs concerning
the efficacy and adequacy of administrative law judge adjudication was the most thor
ough and detailed undertaken to date. Chaired by the Civil Service Commission's then
Deputy Counsel, the laMacchia Committee sought the views of administrative law
judges and sampled the opinions of federal agency officials, private practitioners, and
Bar Association representatives about the quality and quantity of administrative law
judge work products, relationships between judges and their agencies, standards of re
view of administrative law judge decisions, and criteria for recruitment of administrative
593
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legal jousts before the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) and
the federal courts.
Because the core of the sanctioning power over administrative
law judges is found in 5 U.S.c. § 752 I(a)'s provision for removal
"for good cause,"2 this article shall focus on legislative history, pol
icy issues and precedents that provide its contexts, limit its contours
and suggest its contents. Adoption by Congress, in 1946, of the
"good cause" standard for removal of hearing examiners as part of
law judges. See UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMM'N, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
ON THE STUDY OF THE UTILIZATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES (LAMACCHIA
COMM. REPORT) (1974). The findings of the LaMacchia Study were summarized in the
author's 1975 Report to the Administrative Conference, SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY
OF THE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 94TH CONG., 1ST SESS.• RECENT STUDIES RELE
VANT TO THE DISABILITY HEARINGS AND ApPEALS CRISIS 171-245 (Comm. Print 1975).
An Advisory Committee on Administrative Law Judges was established by the then
Civil Service Commission in 1976 to make recommendations to the Commission for im
provements in managerial effectiveness and utilization of administrative law judges.
Prior to being disbanded by the Carter administration as a consequence of the adminis
tration's hostility as a matter of principle to advisory committees, the Advisory Commit
tee on Administrative Law Judges made four explicit recommendations and called for
"thorough study" of other key issues not ripe for resolution by consensus. The four
recommendations were I) that the Civil Service Commission take appropriate steps to
remove administrative law judges from the coverage of the Veteran's Preference Act;
2) that the practice of selective certification be abandoned upon removal of administra
tive law judges from the coverage of the Veteran's Preference Act; 3) that the Civil Serv
ice Commission reduce the list of types of occupations that do not count towards
qualifying experience for administrative law judge positions; and 4) that the Civil Service
Commission modify its requirement of recency of qualifying experience for appointment
as an administrative law judge.
On the issue of tenure of administrative law judges, the Final Report of the Advi
sory Committee stated:
There was some concern expressed that the [administrative law judge) system,
with only two removals in the past 30 years, was not designed to eliminate the
marginal performer. While recognizing that [administrative law judges) were
protected against annual performance evaluation, consideration was given to
the thought that [administrative law judge) performance could be assessed at
the end of a given term appointment, e.g., five years, with the suggestion that
only the satisfactory performer be offered reappointment. On the other hand, it
was pointed out that term appointments would be less likely to attract private
practitioners who would hesitate to change careers for brief periods of time. In
the end. the Committee felt that the [administrative law judge) tenure issue re
quired thorough study before APA amendment could be entertained.
ADVISORY COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES, FINAL REPORT TO THE UNITED
STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMM'N (Feb. 14, 1978).
2. 5 U.S.c. § 7521(a) (1982). Section 7521(a) provides:
An action may be taken against an administrative law judge appointed
under section 3105 of this title by the agency in which the administrative law
judge is employed only for good cause established and determined by the Merit
Systems Protection Board on the record after opportunity for hearing before the
Board.
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the Administrative Procedure Act3 (APA) is the starting point. The
Supreme Court's approaches to and decision in Ramspeck v. Federal
Trial Examiners Conference 4 in 1953 will then be analyzed as the
paramount case involving agency powers over administrative law
judges. Subsequently, Attorney Generals' opinions and Supreme
Court observations regarding the roles and functions of administra
tive law judges are considered contextually as preludes to an analysis
of current conflicts before the MSPB and the federal courts. The
author seeks at the conclusion to distill guidelines that can govern
implementation of the "good cause" standard so as to accord maxi
mum protection to decisional independence and integrity of admin
istrative law judges, while at the same time assuring agencies and the
public of conscientiousness, competence and professionality in
judging.
II.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND "GOOD CAUSE"

If the contents of "for good cause" were clear to a certainty, its

contexts would be superfluous and irrelevant. But reasonable doubt
existed and continues to exist over precisely the extent of indepen
dence Congress intended to confer on hearing examiners through in
3.

Section II of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 provided:
Subject to the civil service and other laws to the extent not inconsistent with
this Act, there shall be appointed by and for each agency as many qualified and
competent examiners as may be necessary for proceedings pursuant to Sections
7 and 8, who shall be assigned to cases in rotation so far as practicable and shall
perform no duties inconsistent with their duties and responsibilities as examin
ers. Examiners shall be removable by the agency in which they are employed
only for good cause established and determined by the Civil Service Commis
sion after opportunity for hearing and upon the record thereof. Examiners shall
receive compensation prescribed by the Commission independently of agency
recommendations or ratings and in accordance with the Classification Act of
1923, as amended, except that the provisions of paragraphs (2) and (3) of sub
section (b) of section 7 of said Act, as amended, and the provisions of section 9
of said Act, as amended, shall not be applicable. Agencies occasionally or tem
porarily insufficiently staffed may utilize examiners selected by the Commission
from and with the consent of other agencies. for the purposes of this section,
the Commission is authorized to make investigations, require reports by agen
cies, issue reports, including an annual report to the Congress, promulgate
rules, appoint such advisory committees as may be deemed necessary, recom
mend legislation, subpoena witnesses or records and pay witness fees as estab
lished for the United States courts.
Ch. 324, § 11,60 Stat. 237, 244 (1944) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (1982».
The sections of the Classification Act of 1923 held inapplicable to hearing examiners
by section 11 of the APA concerned criteria for setting rates of compensation and their
relationships to efficiency ratings of personnel by agency officials. Ch. 346, 55 Stat. 613,
614 (1941).
4. 345 U.S. 128 (1953).
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corporation of that standard into section 11 of the original APA. S
Similarly, reasonable doubt existed over the weight to be accorded
hearing examiners' opinions in a judicial application of the substan
tial evidence standard of review. Justice Frankfurter delivered the
Supreme Court's decision in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,6 a
landmark recognition of the purpose and salience of a hearing exam
iner's decisional independence. 7 This reversed Chief Judge Learned
Hand's painfully derived hypothesis that reviewing judges were
bound to uphold agency decisions, regardless of a hearing exam
iner's findings and opinions, as long as substantial evidence could be
found in the record to support the agency's conclusions. s But just as
Justice Jackson had to avow in Wong Yang Sung v. McGralh 9 the
year before, that the APA contains "many compromises and general
ities and, no doubt, some ambiguities" 10 and that its "legislative his
tory is more confiicting than the text is ambiguous,"11 Justice
Frankfurter needed to point out that Congress adopted the APA as a
whole "with unquestioning-we might even say uncritical-unanim
ity"12 and with a palpable lack of that "clarity of purpose which
Congress supposedly furnishes courts in order to enable them to en
force its true will." 13
Compromise heightens capacity for consensus but does so at the
cost of concomitant ballooning of ambiguity. As Professor Nathan
son noted, with his typical understatement at the time the APA was
adopted, ''the compromise worked out in the drafting of the Act be
tween advocates of uniformity in administrative procedure and the
defenders of diversity and flexibility did not always result in a prod
uct that is crystal clear."14 Small wonder then, that computer-like
precision in delineating the contents of "for good cause" is available
only in dreams. Nonetheless, notwithstanding the avowed uncer
tainties of legislative intent behind key provisions of the APA, points
of specific adoption and rejection by Congress established sufficient
5. Ch. 324,60 Stat. 237,244 (1946) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (1982».
6. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
7. Id. at 475.
8. NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 179 F.2d 749, 753 (1950), vacated, 340 U.S.
474 (1951).
9. 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
10. Id. al 40-41.
11. Id. at 49.
12. Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 482.
13. Id. at 483.
14. Nathanson, Some Comments on the Administrative Procedure Act, 41 ILL. L.
REV. 368,419 (1946).
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contextual meaning to induce Justice Jackson to write of the APA's
ascertainable "formula,"ls and Justice Frankfurter to conclude that
the APA established a "mood" that "must be respected even though
it can only serve as a standard for judgment and not as a body of
rigid rules assuring sameness of application." 16
Insofar as the standard for removal of hearing examiners was
concerned, the context especially worth analyzing was the contrast of
section II's language with the proposal of the Attorney General's
Committee on Administrative Procedure. 17 Congress's rejection of
the tenure proposal for hearing examiners made by the Attorney
General's Committee, and the comments about the choice by leading
members of the Senate and House Judiciary Committees, throw sig
nificant light upon the legislature's· objective in utilizing the termi
nology of "for good cause."
Accompanying the Attorney General's Committee's Report was
"A Bill" putting in the form of proposed legislation, the principal
recommendations for improvements in the administrative process
that it believed susceptible of legislative treatment. Section 302 of
Title III focused on appointment and removal of "hearing commis
sioners." Nomination was to be by "each agency entrusted with the
duty of deciding cases", but the power of appointment was to be
vested in an independent Office of Federal Administrative Procedure
which must find appointees "qualified by training, experience and
character to discharge the responsibilities of the position."18 No
political test or qualification was to be permitted; all nominations
and appointments were to be "made on the basis of merit and effi
ciency alone." 19
Section 302(5) of the Attorney General's Committee's Bill dealt
explicitly with "term of office" for the "hearing commissioners":
Each commissioner shall be appointed for the term of seven years
and shall be removable, within that period, only:
a) Upon charges, first submitted to him by the agency that he
has been gUilty of malfeasance in office or has been neglectful
or inefficient in the performance of duty; or
b) Upon charges of like effect, first submitted to him, by the At
torney General of the United States, which the Attorney Gen
15.
16.
17.

Wong Yang Sung, 339 U.S. at 40.
lIniversal Camera, 340 U.S. at 487.

Arr'y GENERAL'S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, ADMIN. PROCEDURE IN
GOV'T AGENCIES, S. Doc. No.8, 77TH CONG., 1ST SESS. (1941).

18. Id. at 196.
19. Id.
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eral is authorized to make in his discretion after investigation
of any complaint against a hearing commissioner made to
him by a. person other than the agency; or
C) Upon certification by the Director, after application by the
agency, that lack of official business or insufficiency of appro
priation renders necessary the termination of the hearing
commissioner's appointment. 20

Although the Attorney General's Committee was aware and
supportive of the need for hearing officials to be free of any undue
influence, they deemed seven year tenure sufficient to provide the
necessary insulation from political invasion. Congress, in passing
the APA, rejected the Committee's conception of tenure for a specific
term (as well as its "commissioner" title for hearing officers, prefer
ring "examiner") and chose instead the "for good cause" standard as
the only mode of removal. Thus, section II of the APA, as adopted
in 1946, specified that there shall be appointe~ by and for each
agency "as many qualified and competent examiners as may be nec
essary" for proceedings pursuant to the statute:
who shall be assigned to cases in rotation as far as practicable and
shall perform no duties inconsistent with their duties and respon
sibilities as examiners. Examiners shall be removable by the
agency in which they are employed only for good cause estab
lished and determined by the Civil Service Commission after op
portunity for hearing and upon the record thereof. 21

Explaining the policy behind this language of section II, the
Senate Judiciary Committee stated:
That examiners be "qualified and competent" requires the
Civil Service Commission to fix appropriate qualifications and the
agencies to seek fit persons. In view of the tenure and compensa
tion requirements of the section, designed to make examiners
largely independent, self-interest and due concern for the proper
performance of public functions will inevitably move agencies to
secure the highest type of examiners.
The purpose of this section is to render examiners independ
ent and secure in their tenure and compensation. The section thus
takes a different ground than the present situation, in which exam
iners are mere employees of an agency, and other proposals for a
completely separate "examiners' pool" from which agencies might
draw for hearing officers. Recognizing that the entire tradition of
20.
21.

ld.
Ch. 324, § 11,60 Stat. 237, 244 (1946).
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the Civil Service Commission is directed toward security of ten
ure, it seems wise to put that tradition to use in the present case.
However, additional powers are conferred upon the commission.
It must afford any examiner an opportunity for a hearing before
acceding to an agency request for removal, and even then its ac
tion would be subject to judicial review. The hearing and decision
would be made under sections 7 and 8 of this bill. The require
ment of assignment of examiners "in rotation" prevents an agency
from disfavoring an examiner by rendering him inactive.
In the matter of examiners' compensation the section adds
greatly to the Commission's powers and function. It must pre
scribe and adjust examiners' salaries, independently of agency rat
ings and recommendations. The stated inapplicability of specified
sections of the Classification Act carries into effect that authority.
The Commission would exercise its powers by classifying examin
ers' positions and, upon customary examination through its
agents, shift examiners to superior classifications or higher grades
as their experience and duties may require. The Commission
might consult the agency, as it now does in setting up positions or
reclassifying positions, but it would act upon its own responsibility
and with the objects of the bill in mind. 22

The House Judiciary Committee repeated most of the Senate
Committee's observations about section 11. 23
Congressman Walter, in the House of Representatives' discus
sion of the APA, supported further tie-in of examiner "indepen
dence" with utilization of Civil Service Commission machinery in
removal cases:
One of the most controversial proposals in the field of admin
istrative law relates to the status and independence of examiners
who hear cases where agencies themselves or members of boards
cannot do so. . . .
It is often proposed that examiners should be entirely in
dependent of agencies, even to the extent of being separately ap
pointed, housed, and supervised. At the other extreme there is a
demand that examiners be selected from agency employees and
function merely as clerks. In framing this bill we have rejected the
latter view, as the Attorney General's Committee on Administra
tive Procedure throughout the greater part of its final report re
jected it, and have made somewhat different provision for
22. S. Doc. No. 248. 79th Cong.• 2d Sess. (1937). reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HIS
1946, at 215 (1946) [hereinafter

TORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT OF
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY).

23. Id. at 280-81.
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independence. Section 11 recognizes that agencies have a proper
part to play in the selection of examiners in order to secure per
sonnel of the requisite qualifications. However, once selected,
under this bill the examiners are made independent in tenure and
compensation by utilizing and strengthening the existing machin
ery of the Civil Service Commission.
Accordingly, section 11 requires agencies to appoint the nec
essary examiners under the civil service and other laws not incon
sistent with the bill. But they are removable only for good cause
determined by the Civil Service Commission after a hearing, upon
the record thereof, and subject to judicial review. Moreover, their
compensation is to be prescribed and adjusted only by the Civil
Service Commission acting upon its independent judgment. The
Commission is given the necessary powers to operate under this
section, and it may authorize agencies to borrow examiners from
one another.
If there be any criticism of the operation of the civil-service
system, it is that the tenure security of civil-service personnel is
exaggerated. However, it is precisely that full and complete ten
ure security which is widely sought for subordinate administrative
hearing and deciding officers. Section 11 thus makes use of past
experience and existing machinery for the purpose. 24
In his Foreword to the brief volume, Legislative History of the
Administrative Procedure Act ,25 Senator McCarran, the Judiciary
Committee Chairman, maintained that the Act, "Although it is brief,
. . . is a comprehensive charter of private liberty and a solemn un
dertaking of official faimess."26 He may have conveyed more than
he intended when he noted that this statute has been through "a
sieve of consideration by the Congress."27
Professor Morgan Thomas of the University of Michigan main
tained, soon after adoption of the APA, that:
[T)he main change [made by the APA) lay in the new indepen
dence which hearing examiners were to have. To that end they
were explicitly made free of supervision by the investigatory, pros
ecuting and administrative staffs of their agencies. . . . Within
each agency, cases were generally to be rotated so that agency in
24. Id. at 371.
25. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22.
26. Id. at III.
27. Id. Senator McCarran added that the statute "upholds law and yet lightens the
burden of those on whom the law may impinge. It enunciates and emphasizes the tripar
tite form of our democracy and brings into relief the ever essential declaration that this is
a government of law rather than of men." Id.

(984)
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ftuence could not be made effective through assignment of cases.
Moreover the Civil Service Commission was entrusted with the
broad powers which the agencies themselves had previously exer
cised over their trial examiners. Thus the Commission was given
authority to prescribe examiners' grades and salaries and to pass
on promotions independently of agency ratings or recommenda
tions. And an examiner could be removed only if "good cause"
were established at a Civil Service Commission hearing. 28

The guarantee of security of tenure for hearing examiners by
the Civil Service Commission was, according to Professor Thomas,
"the appropriate way to ensure that the examiners would be free
from subservience to their agencies."29 But he probed the scope and
dimensions of hearing examiners' freedom from subservience to
their agencies no more deeply than had Senate and House spokes
men in discussing "for good cause." Did freedom from subservience
require or countenance freedom from accountability? Did it pro
hibit all agency sanctions and discipline against hearing examiners?
Or only those that could prescribe, control or otherwise influence
improperly hearing examiners' decisions? Can a line be drawn and
feasibly enforced between sanctions that do and do not intrude upon
decisional independence?
III.

ApPLICATION OF THE STANDARD

A. Incumbent Trial Examiners at the Enactment of the APA

The great expectation that the Civil Service Commission would
be a paragon of fairness and equity, if not wisdom, in administering
the standards and processes for removal of examiners, was materi
ally corroded at the program's outset when the issue of retention of
incumbent examiners serving at the time the APA took effect had to
be faced. The APA legislative history's pervasive silence extended to
whether those who were trial examiners when the legislation took
effect would have to requalify. Some argued that the lack of criti
cism of existing examiners in the legislative history meant that they
were automatically protected by section 11. On the other hand,
others maintaine~ that the APA in effect abolished all the old trial
examiner positions and created a whole new set of jobs for competi
28. Thomas, The Selection of Federal Hearing Examiners: Pressure Groups and 'he
Administrative Process, 59 YALE L.J. 431, 431-32 (1950) (footnote omitted).
29. Id. at 473-74.
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tion on equal terms by all applicants. 3o
The Civil Service Commission coped with the dispute by ap
pointing an advisory committee to assist in drafting rules for imple
mentation of its AP A roles. That not all members of Congress
thought incumbent examiners to be role models was made clear by
Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Alexander Wiley in a note to
Civil Service Commissioner Arthur Flemming in which he insists
that the Commission demonstrate that the hearing examiners "will
not be men of leftist thinking, men who don't have complete loyalty
to our constitutional system of checks and balances, men who are
not devoted to our system of private enterprise. . . ."31 The Senator
sought "substantial proof' that the Commission would fill these
posts with "men of the highest unimpeachable calibre" rather than
with men who simply have occupied similar positions in the Federal
Government today, who largely are of one party, and who may lack
the approach of private enterprise in their work."32
The Commission deferred definitive action on the status of in
cumbents until after June 11, 1947, the date the APA provisions were
to take effect. It authorized "conditional reappointment" of incum
bents pending final action and, in January 1948, appointed a Board
of Examiners with the authority to determine which incumbent ex
aminers were "eminently qualified" and therefore appointable with
out competitive examination. 33 The Board of Examiners consisted
of two State Supreme Court Judges, one employee of the Civil Serv
ice Commission, and three practicing attorneys who had held high
American Bar Association positions. 34 Professors Morgan Thomas
and Ralph Fuchs, the two major scholars studying hearing examiner
issues at the time, were in agreement that not much was known
about the details of the Board of Examiners' procedures and prac
tices in individual cases. Fuchs declared that, "It is not possible on
the basis of available data to evaluate accurately the quality of the
30. Id. at 433. Thomas told "The Story of the Qualifying Process" in objective
detail, see id. at 433-58, and SUbjected it to incisive critique, id. at 458-75.
31. 17te 150 Hearing Examiners: Chairman Wiley Asks Open Choiceslor Fitness, 33
A.B.A. J. 421, 422 (1947) (hereinafter referred to as 17te 150 Hearing Examiners). In the
same vein, see generally "17te Hearing Examiners: Undecided Questions as 10 17teir Selec
tion," 33 A.B.A.J. 688 (1947).
32. 17te 150 Hearing Examiners, supra note 31, at 422.
33. Details of the Commission's procedures and practices were described both by
Thomas, supra note 28 at 433-58, and by Professor Ralph Fuchs of Indiana University,
who had been a member of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Proce
dure. See Fuchs, 17te Hearing Examiner Fiasco Under the Administrative Procedure Act,
63

HARV.

34.

L. REV. 737 (1950).

Fuchs, JlIpra note 33, at 747.
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examinations that were given... ."3S It was known that investiga
tion of incumbents was conducted by Commission staff under the
direction of the Examiners, and oral interviews were conducted by
the Examiners in panels of two or more. 36 But, as Thomas noted
regarding the investigators' work: "How widely they consulted the
references (listed by the incumbents) and other persons who at that
time or in the past had supervised the incumbents is not known."37
The Board of Examiners' decisions, which were accepted and
translated into the Commission's own official action, were an
nounced in a Commission press release on March II, 1949. 38 Of
212 incumbents rated by the Board of Examiners, 54 or 25.5% were
disqualified. They included 3 out of 5 at the United States Maritime
Commission, 3 out of 5 at the Department of Agriculture, 14 out of
41 at the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), 10 out of 30 at
the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and 12 out of 48 at the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC).39 The only reasons assigned for the
disqualifications were "overall characteristics" or "lack of sufficient
specialized experience."4O
Objections and protests followed. Every affected agency ap
pealed on behalf of its examiners. For example, the NLRB com
plained that: ''The action has eviscerated the hearing examiner staff
at a time when its caseload is singularly great. . . . The Board will
be unable efficiently to pursue its regular operations without the
services of these trained men, many of whom have been with the
Board for over a decade."41
The ICC Practitioners Association called upon Congress to in
vestigate the Civil Service Commission's "violence to one's sense of
justice and fair play" in the rating of incumbent examiners. 42 On
their own behalf, examiners complained that it was impossible for
them to appeal effectively since the Board of Examiners had failed to
identify in what respects each hearing examiner had been found
wanting. 43
Responding to the criticism, the Commission's staff subse
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See iri. at 751.
[d. at 752 & n.62.
Thomas, supra note 28, at 440.
[d. at 441-42.
[d. at 442-43.
[d. at 442.
Quoted by Thomas, supra note 28, at 444.
[d. at 455 (quoting 16 I.C.C. Prac. 1. 706, 710 (1949».
[d. at 445.
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quently prepared a "Basis of Findings" item for each instance of
disqualification and listed criticisms such as "lack of fairness," "arbi
trariness," "immaturity," or "biased in certain respects" in place of
the previous "overall characteristics." Where disqualification. was
due to lack of sufficient specialized experience, the Commission then
specified the experience not credited as being "specialized."44 At
tacks on the work of the Board of Examiners did not abate, however.
Indeed, charges escalated, ranging from lack of legitimate authority
to economic and religious bias. 45 The charges, countercharges, and
evidence introduced in ensuing proceedings indicate that "serious
misstatements and omisisons" were contained in the 1948 investiga
tions of incumbents. 46 Where second investigations were under
taken, there were "marked discrepancies" with the reports of the first
in vestigations. 47
These events, not surprisingly, led to the resignation of the
Board of Examiners and to further changes in the Civil Service
Commission's register of eligible hearing examiners.48 On Decem
ber 13, 1949, the Commission rescinded its firing of the incumbent
examiners found less than eminently qualified by the Board of Ex
aminers, "herald [ing] the end of one of the bitterest behind-the
scenes fights Washington has seen in recent years. "49 Professor
Thomas praised the Commission's action as a necessary corrective
rather than a capitulation to the "temptation to contrive petty ways
of muddling through and saving face."50 Professor Fuchs cautioned
that the hearing examiner program would remain a fiasco "if the
Civil Service Commission continues to permit itself to be pushed
first in one direction and then in another by outside pressures."51 It
is "particularly depressing," he added, "that an agency of govern
ment that traditionally embodies the highest rectitude should appear
in such a role."52
The federal government's only experience prior to recent MSPB
proceedings with evaluation and removal of incumbent hearing of
ficers turned out to be a model of how not to proceed. From the
establishment of the Board of Examiners to the final effectual
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

/d.
/d. at 445-54.
/d. at 452.
/d. at 453.
/d. at 456.
/d. at 431.
/d. at 475.
Fuchs, supra note 33, at 767.
/d.
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"grand fathering" of the incumbents into APA status, the experience
was marked by dissonance, ambiguity, vacillation and pressure. The
problem was not primarily that the "for good cause" standard of
removal was not deemed applicable by the ill-fated Board of Exam
iners; it was that both Board and Civil Service Commission es
chewed consistent adherence to any rational standard for deciding
which hearing examiners would be retained and which would leave
as the APA era dawned. Instead, Board and Commission fell "vic
tim to the winds of the moment. "53

B. Case Low
Hearing examiners and the District of Columbia Federal Dis
trict Court made the contents of "for good cause" a central legal
issue when the Civil Service Commission adopted rules in 195 154 for
promotion, compensation and reductions in force of hearing examin
ers. Ultimately, the Supreme Court's decision in Romspeck rejected
the construction of "for good cause" put forth by the examiners and
accepted by District Judge Bolitha Laws when, instead of the narrow
"personal disqualification" connotation emphasized in the district
court, the Supreme Court majority adopted a concept of "for good
cause" in accordance with the findings and reasons of the
Commission. 55
Ruling on motions for summary judgment filed by both plain
tiffs and defendants in the action, Judge Laws had granted the exam
iners' motion and denied the Commission's without any doubt as to
the meaning of the APA's section II. Separation of hearing examin
ers by reductions in force was contrary to the Act because, in part,
the statute's language, stating that examiners may be removed "only
for good cause," had to be construed in light of the "significant"
finding that "reduction in force provisions in earlier drafts of legisla
tion governing administrative procedure were omitted from the Ad
ministrative Procedure Act as passed. . . ."56
Judge Laws
maintained that "the importance of security of tenure to indepen
dence ofjudgment needs no argument and was clearly recognized by
the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
53. Id. at 768.
54. 5 C.F.R. § 34.15 (Supp. 1951).
55. 345 U.S. at 143.
56. Federal Trial Examiners' Conference v. Ramspeck. 104 F. Supp. 734. 740-41
(emphasis added by coun). aJrd. 202 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1952). rev'd. 345 U.S. 128
(1953).
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Procedure.
"57
Whether or not Judge Laws was correct in viewing the Attorney
General's Committee proposal for a seven year term for hearing ex
aminers as recognition of security tenure's importance, the court of
appeals' majority, consisting of Judges Miller and Proctor, routinely
agreed with him in a two-paragraph, seventy word opinion. 58 Judge
Bazelon dissented at some length, repudiating in particular the
notion that "for good cause" was confined to "a personal shortcom
ing-malfeasance, incompetence or some kindred disqualifica
tion. "59 Quoting from Senate Report 752 in the APA's Legislative
History, Bazelon maintained that Congress "put 'the entire tradition
of the Civil Service Commission . . . to use' when it prescribed a
new system of tenure for hearing examiners in section 11."60 Crite
ria for reductions in force "are now a firmly embedded implementa
tion of that 'tradition.' "61
In two particularly salient paragraphs, Judge Bazelon con
tended that the examiners' view of section 11,
which is adopted by the [district] court, goes much farther along
the road toward complete examiner independence than Congress
itself was willing to travel. In enacting [section] 11, Congress
sought to strike a balance between the need for administrative effi
ciency and expertise and the need for freeing hearing examiners
from dictation or intimidation by the agencies. Accordingly, Con
gress did not adopt any of the extreme proposals to isolate hearing
examiners from the agencies or insulate them completely from ex
pressions of the agencies' views. . . . Instead Congress adopted
the less extreme proposal of removing from the agencies and giv
ing to the Commission wide powers over the selection, compensa
tion and removal of hearing examiners. This was the means
adopted to end ''the present situation in which examiners are mere
employees of an agency."62

Judge Bazelon's concluding paragraph enlarged upon the ad
ministrative discretion dimension of this analysis. Proceeding from
the premise that much of the attack on the Commission's regulations
has been "leveled at the possibility they offer for frustrating the pur
57. Id. at 741.
58. Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners' Conference, 202 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir.
1952). rev'd. 345 U.S. 128 (1953).
59. Id. at 313 (Bazelon. J.• dissenting) (quoting Brieffor Appellees at 36) (empha
sis added).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 314-15.
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pose of the Administrative Procedure Act to free hearing examiners
from agency domination and coercion," Judge Bazelon admitted
"that the possibility exists cannot be denied."63 But, he insisted, that
possibility
is not so gross as to make the regulations invalid. . . . Congress
has a right to rely upon the administrators to keep faith with the
spirit of the statute. The record in this case does not reveal that
that confidence was misplaced. If individual instances of abuses
should arise in the future which threaten to thwart the spirit of the
statute, the means are available to put the matter right.64

Without mentioning Judge Bazelon's dissent directly, the
Supreme Court majority accepted his view of section 11 although its
reasoning was neither as overt or precise. What is abundantly clear
from the record of the case, notwithstanding any imprecision of rea
soning, is that the justices rejected the views of Judge Laws and the
court of appeals' majority and largely ignored additional arguments
presented in the examiners' brief by Charles Rhyne, Eugene Brad
ley, Eugene Mullin and Brice Rhyne. 6S
Counsel for the examiners stressed, for example, the difference
in meaning between statutory provision for removal of personnel for
"such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service" and re
moval "only for good cause." The former clearly authorized a reduc
tion in force because such reductions, undertaken when work and
funds were no longer available, could be said to promote the serv
ice's efficiency. But "only for good cause" required "something
more than normal civil service tenure."66
Rhyne further argued that, in section 11, Congress chose delib
erately to use phraseology different from standard traditional Civil
Service tenure language; it rejected efficiency of the service as the
criterion for removal of hearing examiners and chose to provide ex
aminers with "extraordinary protection" consonant with the unique
ness of their functions within the administrative process, as
compared with agency employees in genera1. 67 Congress did not
provide simply that examiners shall be removable for good cause or
that they shall be removable for good cause only after hearing but
that they shall be removable "only for good cause," language which
63. Id. at 316.
64. Id.
65. 345 U.S. at 129-43.
66. Rhyne brief for Federal Trial Examiners' Conference at 74; Ramspeck.
67. Id. at 81.
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is "manifestly different and which clearly excludes removal for any
reason other than good cause. "68 Because good cause "connotes a
personal disqualification," an employee removed by reduction in
force procedures has not been removed "for good cause."69
To cope with the argument by counsel for the Commission that
the examiners were claiming "lifetime jobs during 'good behavior'
irrespective of the workload of their agencies or the availability of
funds with which to pay them," Rhyne maintained that respondents
never contended that a hearing examiner has an inalienable right
to retain his salary when there is no work for him to do. . . . Sec
tion 11 does not purport to state all the reasons for which examin
ers may be removed. It does state all the reasons for which they
may be removed "by the agency in which they are em
ployed". . . . There. . . is no doubt as to the power of Congress
to remove examiners, or to abolish their positions. 70

Furthermore, the APA's authorization of interagency borrowing of
examiners and of assignment of them to duties compatible with their
responsibilities as examiners were the statute's designated ways for
dealing with workload changes. 7 J
Counsel for the examiners sought to reinforce their argument
that removals by reductions in force are prohibited by section II
with a detailed discussion of the requirements for and prohibitions
of efficiency ratings. Statutes and regulations governing reductions
in force traditionally required that efficiency ratings be taken into
account.
When Congress forbade efficiency ratings for examiners, it knew
that efficiency ratings were utilized by the agencies in reduction in
force to determine not only the relative standing of an employee
within his competitive level but also the very competitive level in
which he was to be placed. Congress' action in prohibiting effi
ciency ratings for examiners is utterly inconsistent with an intent
that examiners be subject to removal by reduction in force.72

Without discussing at all the similarities and differences be
tween the "efficiency of the service" standard and "for good cause"
standard for removal of personnel, the Supreme Court majority sim
ply punctured the examiners' and lower courts' positions by pro
6S.

69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 75.
Id. at 71.
/d. at SO.
Id. at SI.
Id. at 76.
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claiming that "[a] reduction in force for the reasons heretofore
provided by the Civil Service Commission and removal of an exam
iner in accordance therewith is 'good cause' within the meaning of
[section] 11."73 Echoing Judge Bazelon's faith in the corrective and
preventive roles of the Commission, the justices maintained that "[i]t
must be assumed that the Commission will prevent any devious
practice by an agency which would abuse this Rule. The Rule pro
vides for examiner appeal to the Commission, so there is opportunity
to bring abuses to the Commission's attention."74
At the core of the reversal by the Supreme Court majority of the
lower courts' rulings, was the justices' rejection of the proposition
that the APA was designed to make trial examiners ''very nearly the
equivalent of judges even though operating within the Federal sys
tem of administrative justice."7s Justice Minton, who wrote the ma
jority's opinion, regarded this statement in a letter from Senator
McCarran, then Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, to
Chairman Ramspeck of the Civil Service Commission as "taken out
of context" because of its having been ''written over five years after
the [APA] was enacted."76 Thus he refused to consider it illustrative
of the intent of Congress at the time it passed the Act. Whereas the
dissenters stressed, as a prime APA objective, giving examiners "a
new status of freedom from agency control,"77 the majority saw pre
vention of agency abuses of examiners' integrity and impartiality as
the key objectives of the Act rather than the achievement of total
independence. The thrust of the APA, according to Minton, was
that hearing officers ''were not to be paid, promoted or discharged at
the whim or caprice of the agency or for political reasons."78 In
other respects, traditional personnel practices of the Civil Service
Commission were to be retained, including "reduction in force for
lack of funds, personnel ceilings, reorganizations, decrease of work,
and similar reasons."79
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Romspeck denied
APA hearing officers the total independence they sought, it empha
sized at the same time the obligation of the Civil Service Commis
73. Ramspeck, 345 u.s. at 143.
74. Id. at 142.
75. Id. at 144 (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting S. Doc. No. 82, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
9).
76. Id. at 143 n.9.
77. Id. at 144.
78. Id. at 142.
79. Id. (citation omitted).
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sion to "prevent any devious practice by an agency" that would
abuse examiners' integrity or impartiality or subject them to political
controls.80 The APA did not reduce the responsibility of an agency
to assure that it had a sufficient number of competent examiners to
handle its business properly, but it clearly put the responsibility in
the Commission's hands to insure that examiners would be free from
the influences of politics, whim or caprice.
The Supreme Court has not, since the Ramspeck decision, con
sidered directly the scope and contours of "for good cause." None
theless, its decision 25 years after Ramspeck, in Butz v. Economou, 81
can be cited as an extension of the justices' concern with the inde
pendence of administrative law judges beyond the majority's posi
tion in 1953. Whereas the majority in Ramspeck rejected the
proposition that trial examiners were "very nearly the equivalent of
judges even though operating within the Federal system of adminis
trative justice,"82 Justice White pointed out in Butz that "adjudica
tion within a federal administrative agency shares enough of the
characteristics of the judicial process that those who participate in
such adjudication should also be immune from suits for damages."83
While Justice White's extended observations regarding adminis
trative law judges in the Butz case could be dismissed as pure dic
tum, it is more likely that they constituted both an affirmation of
judicial respect for these hearing officials whose role is "functionally
comparable to that of a judge," and a hint that the courts might have
to reassess their present approach to judicial review of agency deci
sion making if the independence of administrative law judges were
reduced:
More importantly, the process of agency adjudication is currently
structured so as to assure that the hearing examiner exercises his
independent judgment on the evidence before him, free from pres
sures by the parties or other officials within the agency. Prior to
the Administrative Procedure Act, there was considerable concern
that persons hearing administrative cases at the trial level could
not exercise independent judgment because they were required to
perform prosecutorial and investigative functions as well as their
judicial work. . . and because they were often subordinate to ex
ecutive officials within the agency. . . . The Administrative Pro
cedure Act contains a number of provisions designed to guarantee
80. Id.
81. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
82. Ramspeclc. 345 U.S. at 143 n.9.
83. 438 U.S. at 512-13.
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the independence of hearing examiners. They may not perform
duties inconsistent with their duties as hearing examiners . . . .
When conducting a hearing under [section] 5 of the APA ... a
hearing examiner is not responsible to, or subject to the supervi
sion or direction of, employees or agents engaged in the perform
ance of investigative or prosecution functions for the agency . . . .
Nor maya hearing examiner consult any person or party, includ
ing other agency officials, concerning a fact at issue in the hearing,
unless on notice and opportunity for all parties to participate. . . .
Hearing examiners must be assigned to cases in rotation so far as
is practicable. . . . They may be removed only for good cause
established and determined by the Civil Service Commission after
a hearing on the record. . . . Their pay is also controlled by the
Civil Service Commission.
In light of these safeguards, we think that the risk of an un
constitutional act by one presiding at an agency bearing is clearly
outweighed by the importance of preserving the independent
judgment of these men and women. 84

If these "safeguards" are removed and the "independent judg
ment" of administrative law judges is jeopardized, it would be only
natural to expect a revision of present comity and perhaps a rever
sion by the courts to the adversarial if not hostile dimensions ofjudi
cial review of agency action of yesteryear.
The 1980 decision by the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir
cuit in Nash v. Ca/[fano 8S provided an additional supportive footnote
to the Supreme Court's emphasis on the independence of adminis
trative law judges in BulZ. The underlying issue in the Nash case
was whether an administrative law judge had standing to sue when
an agency allegedly interfered with his or her decisional indepen
dence. 86 The district court judge had ruled that Simon Nash, a judge
with twenty-two years experience in the Social Security Administra
tion's Bureau of Hearings and Appeals,87 had not suffered the in
jury-in-fact required by the doctrine of standing when Nash was
subjected to the Bureau's program of monitoring and reviewing the
decisions of its administrative law judges. 88 Among other conten
tions, Judge Nash complained that arbitrary monthly production
quotas had been established by the Agency and that what the
Agency designated as a "quality assurance program" was in reality
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 513·14 (citations omitted).
613 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1980).
See id. at 11·14.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
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an attempt to direct the number of decisions awarding or denying
Social Security benefits. Administrative law judges who deviated
from ~he "average" SO percent reversal rate for all decisions were
allegedly counseled and admonished to bring their rates in line with
the national average on pain of sanctions. 89
While carefully noting that his ruling dealt in no way with the
merits of Judge Nash's contentions, Judge Kaufman first quoted
from Justice White in Bulz on the current structuring of agency ad
judication so as to assure administrative law judges "independent
judgment."90 He continued by ruling that "express prohibitions of
performance evaluation and substantive review [by the administra
tive law judge's agency] contained in 5 U.S.C. § 4301, and appel
lant's position description promulgated by the Bureau of Hearings
and Appeals, give his injury the required direct impact upon statuto
rily created rightS."91 Judge Kaufman closed the panel's unanimous
opinion that Judge Nash had standing to sue with the admonition
that "good administration must not encroach upon adjudicative in
dependence [for] the principal goal of judicial and quasi-judicial ad
ministration [which is] reduction of delay without compromise to the
demands of due process [requires for its fulfillment] judicial inde
pendence [as] one important part."92
C. Allorney General Opinions and Ihe Borsky-Mahin Sludy

The dimensions and nuances of administrative law judge inde
pendence received specific attention from attorneys· general in three
89. Id. at IS (quoting Butz, 438 U.S. at 513).·
90. Id.
91. Id. at 17.
92. Id. at 17-18. In a Seventh Circuit case decided in February, 1983, the court
ruled that Social Security Administration administrative law judges do not have standing
to seek an injunction against an instruction SSA issued to its judges concerning a "new
policy" for dealing with retroactive cessation of disabilities. According to Judge Posner
of the Seventh Circuit, ''The instruction ... did truncate the administrative law judges'
adjudicative discretion," D'Amico v. Schweiker, 698 F.2d 903, 905 (7th Cir. 1983); but
"(tJhe withdrawal, as in this case, of one issue from the factfinding power of the adminis
trative law judges does not significantly impair 'decisional independence.''' Id. at 907.
Judge Posner construed Judge Kaufman's decision upholding standing in Noslr as stem
ming from impairment of the administrative law judges "qualified right of decisional
independence" and concluded that no significant impairment of such independence was
wrought here by withdrawal of adjudicative discretion over retroactive cessation of disa
bilities. Id. at 907. Whereas standing may be appropriate to "housekeeping" cases in
volving judges, it is not appropriate, according to Judge Posner, to cases involving
"substantive directives" that put the judicial officers suing to enjoin them "in the position
of taking sides in controversies" they are supposed to adjudicate impartially. Id. at 907.
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opinions between 1951 and 1977.93 These, together with a compre
hensive study in 1960 of hearing examiner roles in the decisional
machinery of the Social Security Administration by Charles Hor
sky94 suggest a distinction between administrative law judges' inde
pendence of judgment and independence of personal behavior and
work habits. Attorney General Levi's 1977 ruling on the power of
an agency official to reprimand a judge drew the distinction explic
itly;9S and the Horsky Report did so implicitly.96 Attorney General
Ford's 1951 opinion97 and Attorney General Katzenbach's 1964
opinion,98 on aspects of promotion of hearing examiners, were com
patible with the Levi-Horsky distinction.
Faced with the question of whether, as a general rule, employ
ing agencies may promote hearing examiners, or whether the Civil
Service Commission was charged with the responsibility of the selec
tion of hearing examiners for promotion, Peyton Ford ruled that the
APA's requirement in section 11 that examiners "shall receive com
pensation prescribed by the Commission independently of agency
recommendations or ratings,"99 plainly meant that salaries and pro
motions of examiners should be kept separate from any agency con
trol. Ford stressed that "the hope of promotion may motivate men
as strongly as the fear of loss of their jobs. If salaries and promo
tions are subject to agency control, there is always danger that a sub
tle influence will be exerted upon the examiners to decide in
accordance with agency wishes."loo The employing agency is not
forbidden to make suggestions or recommendations to the Civil
Service Commission, but the Commission must assume "the full re
sponsibility for the selection of those to be promoted" and must ar
rive at its decisions ''through the independent exercise of its own
judgment." JO I
Attorney General Katzenbach's 1964 opinion focused on a nar
row facet of the promotion issue: "When an agency proposes to fill a
Chief Hearing Examiner's position by the promotion of one of its
93. See 41 Op. AU'y Gen. 74 (1951); 42 Op. AU'y Gen. 289 (1974); 43 Op. AU'y
Gen. 1 (1977).
94. Horsky &. Mahin, The Operation of the Social Security Administration Hear
ing and Decisional Machinery (1960) (mimeo).
95. 43 Op. AU'y Gen. 1 (1977); see infra text accompanying notes 104-09.
96. See infra text accompanying notes 110-20.
97. 41 Op. AU'y Gen. 74 (1951).
98. 42 Op. AU'y Gen. 289 (1964).
99. 5 U.S.c. § 7521(a) (1982).
100. 41 Op. AU'y Gen. 74,78 (1951).
101. Id. at 79.
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hearing examiners, must the Civil Service Commission select the
hearing examiner who is to be promoted?" 102 Katzenbach ruled
that, because the designation of the chief hearing examiner "quite
clearly involves something more than a mere increase in compensa
tion," and because even the increase in compensation rests on the
individual's "substantial administrative and managerial responsibili
ties" rather than on his or her quasi-judicial responsibilities, the
agencies have the power to appoint an incumbent hearing examiner
to chief hearing examiner, and the Civil Service Commission does
not have that power. 103
It is of course possible, Katzenbach recognized,
that the carrot of an appointment to a Chief Hearing Examiner
position could be used to exert a subtle influence on the examiner
to decide as the agency wishes. However, the same possibilities
already exist with regard to appointments to membership in the
agency or to other highly paid positions in the Federal Govern
ment. Congress recognized that such possibilities can never be
wholly eliminated; it sought merely to mjnimize them. 104

If a fine line could be maintained between promotion for mana
gerial functions and promotion for performance of quasi-judicial
roles, could a parallel distinction be drawn regarding reprimands?
Attorney General Levi explicated such a distinction in responding to
the question: "May the head of an agency of the Federal Govern
ment issue a reprimand to an [a]dministrative [l]aw UJudge em
ployed in his agency without initiation of proceedings before the
Civil Service Commission?" lOS
Recognizing at the outset that the question presented posed "in
a new context the recurrent issue of the intended scope of the inde~
pendence of administrative law judges from the control of their par
ent agencies, " Levi stated that the APA provided administrative law
judges "a certain degree of independence of status but not complete
independence from administrative control."l06 Reprimands for fail
ure to report to work on time or to put in a full day did not have to
await the adjudication of charges by the Civil Service Commission.
On the other hand, independence of action in the conduct of formal
AP A proceedings was clearly established by the APA for hearing
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

42 Op. AU'y Gen. 289 (1964).
Id. at 297-300.
Id. at 299.
43 Op. AU'y Gen. 1 (1977).
Id. at 3.
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officers. Such functions as regulating the course of the hearing, hold
ing conferences for settlement or simplification of issues, disposing
of procedural requests, and making or recommending decisions, as
set out in section 556(c),107 were typical of roles requiring unencum
bered independence of judgment. Thus, while not ruling out repri
mands for purely administrative infractions, "the clear legislative
prescription for independence of adjudicatory action clearly does
prevent the use of the reprimand as a means of affecting, controlling
or sanctioning an administrative law judge's decision in a formal
APA proceeding." 108
In the particular instance, the administrative law judge had
been reprimanded for issuing a decision in violation of a commit
ment that had been made by the Interior Department to a federal
district court judge to withhold administrative action in the case.
Levi unequivocally construed the issuance of a decision by an ad
ministrative law judge as constituting an exercise of his APA adjudi
catory responsibilities:
The action to be taken was not ministerial; nor do the facts as
presented involve any formal judicial injunction against issuance.
Judgment, then, had to be exercised-and a sort of judgment
which, in the context, was essentially judicial, and was to be made
by the administrative law judge according to his own understand
ing and conscience. In my view, therefore, an agency reprimand
with respect to that decision was improper. 109

Reprimands for administrative infractions could be adminis
tered by agencies but were not entrusted solely to agency discretion.
According to Attorney General Levi, the dangers of abuse through
using such reprimands as instruments of punishment for ··displeas
ing adjudicatory activity" required subjecting the judges to the su
pervision and correctives of the Civil Service Commission. 110 In
sum, then, reprimands by employing agencies for judgment-related
action by administrative law judges were forbidden; reprimands for
administrative infractions were permissible, subject to the Commis
sion's responsibility to protect against abuse. Levi's opinion made
explicit an analysis of the contours of the independence of adminis
trative law judges that was implicit in a study done by Charles Hor
107.
108.
109.
110.

5 U.S.C. § 556(c) (1982).
43 Op. AU'y Gen. 1,6.
[d. at 7.
[d. at 5.
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sky for the Social Security Administration seventeen years earlier. III
Charles Horsky and Amy Mahin of the Washington firm of
Covington and Burling, having undertaken the assignment from the
Social Security Administration "to recommend measures that would
facilitate and expedite the disposition of cases, " determined, by the
time they filed their report in December, 1960, that "we could be of
greater service by attempting to insure that overemphasis on speed
would not be the occasion for underemphasis on fair procedures."I 12
As a component of relationships between speed and fairness, they
examined the extent to which agency hearing examiners had been
accorded the "independence" to which they were entitled by the
APA.
Interestingly, the authors ascribed to the Court the position of
the minority in Romspeck and then proceeded to inquire: "What is
meant by or included within the term 'independence,' or 'freedom
from agency control' to use the language of the Supreme Court?"113
Their complex answer endeavored to draw a fine line between free
dom from control in fact-finding and freedom from control in deter
mining policy.
Horsky and Mahin began their analysis with the proposition
that, taken as a whole, section II of the AP A "indeed represents a
significant 'bill of rights' for Federal hearing examiners." 114 But it
did not establish an unlimited sphere of entitlement to non-interfer
ence. It did not make an examiner the equivalent of a federal dis
trict court judge, for example, nor did it confine the agency
relationship with an examiner to one similar to a court of appeals
judge and district court judge. They preferred viewing the examiner
"as a member of a regulatory team-independent of the agency to be
sure, in the section II sense, but nonetheless subordinate in the sense
Horsky & Mahin, supra note 94.
/d. at 462. Horskyand Mahin were requested by the Social Security Admin
istration to make a study of:
( I) Operations under the existing organizational structure of the Office of
Hearings and Appeals; (2) Practices, procedures and instructions affecting the
relationship between the Office of Hearings and Appeals, its hearing exaininers
and appellants; (3) The effect of (I) and (2) upon the independence of hearing
examiners in deciding cases under Title II of the Social Security Act and upon
the fairness of hearings.
Id. at 2. Based upon that study, Horsky and Mahin were to make recommendations "for
such changes as may be necessary or appropriate which would (I) assure the indepen·
dence of hearing examiners and the impartiality of the hearing and review process; and
(2) facilitate the disposition of cases by hearing examiners and the Appeals Council." Id.
113. Id. at 375-76.
114. Id. at 377.
III.

112.
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that his work must mesh with and adapt and conform itself to the
role and responsibility of the agency."lIS
The examiner must be "free from outside interference from any
source" in making determinations as to the facts in each case. "To
conclude from that, however, that the examiner must therefore be
free to make his determination as to the decision in every case free
from similar interference is to ignore the basic distinction between
facts, on the one hand, and law and policy of the agency, on the
other."116 Implementation of basic policy set by Congress is the
province of the agency through rule making or through a course of
decisions. The only time an examiner is justified in making policy
decisions is "when the policy of the agency has not yet been defined
in the circumstances with which he must deal."117
The examiner's independence, and the safeguards to that inde
pendence contained in section II relate not to matters of law or pol
icy but ''to his judgments in connection with the facts. No matter
how unpleasant or unwelcome or embarrassing the facts may be to
an agency, the examiner must be free from any pressures which
would color or distort his report of them." 118 Thus, a request to an
examiner to submit his decision to the agency for comment before
releasing it is clearly "unwise and improper." 119 But efforts to im
prove the quality and "reasonable productivity" of examiners can be
undertaken through "post-reviews."
Although Horsky & Mahin believed that the agency had the
power and responsibility to improve the performance of deficient ex
aminers, including increasing their disposition rate, they were op
posed to "norms which are set across the board for hearing
examiners generally and norms derived from fixed quotas set in ad
vance."120 They suggested, without drawing any conclusion regard
ing its relationship to removal, that a distinction be drawn
between the examiner who is producing to the limit of his capacity
and producing far less than the average examiner and the exam
iner who is likewise producing far less but for reasons of inatten
tion to his work, poor work habits, inefficient use of his clerical
assistants, unwillingness to seek advice or help on problems where
lIS. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

at
at
at
at
at
at

379.
381.
382.
383.
390.
398.
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advice and help are available and useful, and the like. 121
The Attorney Generals' opinions and the Horsky-Mahin study
contributed authoritative analysis and contextual substance to the
contours of the "independence" of administrative law judges but
they failed to come to grips with what constitutes "for good cause"
when proceedings for suspension or removal of administrative law
judges are commenced.

D. Merit Systems Protection Board
The first determination by the Civil Service Commission of
whether particular deficiencies in performance by a hearing officer
met the "for good cause" standard of removal was undertaken in
1978. While that case was pending, the adjudicatory authority of the
Civil Service Commission was transferred to the new Merit Systems
Protection Board (MSPB). Action against an administrative law
judge was initiated by the Director of the Office of Hearings and
Appeals of the Social Security Administration (SSA) on grounds
that the judge had conducted an unauthorized hearing after the Bu
reau's Appeals Council had removed that case from his jurisdiction.
Further, the judge had refused to deliver case files after official re
quests to do so, and presided over cases with acute partiality and
lack of judicial temperament. After a hearing before the MSPB's
administrative law judge, a comprehensive "recommended decision"
was issued against the SSA judge in December 1978, finding that
"good cause has been established for the removal."122
The SSA judge relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in
BulZ for the contention that an administrative law judge was not
answerable in any respect for conduct involving the performance of
duties in officially assigned cases. The MSPB's judge rejected this
defense, stating that "the respondent confuses judicial independence
with judicial immunity." Although it is "almost a universal rule"
that a judge cannot be removed because of errors or mistakes in
judgment, nothing in the APA or in the Butz opinion "can be con
strued as precluding removal of an administrative law judge for mis
conduct, incompetence or other failings in the performance of
adjudicatory duties."123
121. Id. at 397.
122. In re Chocallo, 2 M.S.P.B. 23, 70 (1980) (McCanhey, J., recommended deci
sion) (memorandum opinion and order of the Merit Systems Protection Board, 2
M.S.P.B. 20 (1980».
123. Id. at 27.
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Citing the American Bar Association's Code of Judicial Con
duct as professional recognition of the propriety of disciplinary ac
tion for judicial misconduct,124 the MSPB's judge concluded that
conducting a hearing and issuing a decision after jurisdiction legally
had been taken away and refusal to comply with orders to deliver
case files became "the antithesis of law and order which the judge
personifies. . . ."125 In addition, the MSPB's judge found that the
SSA judge had displayed, in another specific case, a "truly startling
example of intemperate judicial conduct" in refusing to accord rea
sonable opportunity for the designated attorney to be heard and to
represent the interests of his client. Furthermore, respondent "mis
used the hearing process" by conducting a unilateral inquiry into
privileged communications between attorney and client. Other man
ifestations of "fiagrant and uncontrolled bias" by the SSA judge
were found in the use of sarcastic and scathing language to denounce
the attorney's veracity, intelligence, and emotional soundness. 126
Each of the foregoing actions was found to constitute "good
cause" for removal. The MSPB's judge was careful to note nonethe
less, that removal proceedings based upon events in the hearing
room should be reserved for serious improprieties, fiagrant abuses,
or repeated breaches of acceptable standards of judicial behavior:
"The Commission is not constituted to serve as a performance evalu
ation board. . . to decide whether isolated remarks or rulings made
by an administrative law judge in the course of a hearing measure up
to some undefined ideal expected of those who conduct proceedings
under the Administrative Procedure Act."127
The MSPB commended its judge for a "meticulous well-con
ceived and correct interpretation and application of the facts and
law."128 Consonant with its understanding of the major underlying
purpose of the APA, the Board insisted that "a careful balance must
be created between judicial independence and judicial accountabil
ity."129 The Board closed its opinion with the assurance that agen
cies considering similar actions against administrative law judges
"will be very carefully scrutinized for adequate bases in meeting the
'good cause' standard. Imposition of this degree of review in such
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
order).
129.

See generally CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972).
Id. at 36.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 43, 62-65.
Id.; In re Chocallo, 2 M.S.P.B. 20, 21 (1980) (memorandum opinion and
Id. at 22.
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instances is essential to ensure the necessary balance between the in
terests to be considered and the Board will not neglect its duty in
fulfilling that goal."130
In a subsequent case involving alleged personal misconduct by
an SSA judge for hostile acts toward fellow employees (including
closing and holding down the vinyl lid of a copying machine on the
fellow employee's hand while that employee was seeking to retrieve
her original memorandum that complained about remarks the judge
had made), the Board sustained findings by the MSPB judge in his
"Recommended Decision" that there was "good cause" for a 30 day
suspension of the SSA judge,l31 The MSPB judge ruled that "such
aggressive, disrespectful behavior toward a fellow employee must be
disapproved;"132 and the Board agreed. 133
IV.

Low

PRODUCTIVITY AS "GOOD CAUSE" FOR REMOVAL

As chronicled in the preceding section of this article, after a
lengthy prelude of authoritative contextual, declaratory and admoni
tory opinions by courts, attorneys general and researchers construing
the AP A's constraints on agency powers vis a vis administrative law
judges, overt invocation and application of "for good cause" began
in 1978 in actual removal and disciplinary proceedings instituted by
agencies before the Merit Systems Protection Board. It has since
been gathering steam. The steam is currently being generated at full
throttle as, for the first time since adoption of the APA, the profes
sional fate of some administrative law judges hinged on whether "for
good cause" is held to be satisfied by proving that they consistently
produced fewer decisions per month than the average produced by
their peers in the agency and failed, after notice and alleged oppor
tunity to do so, to improve their yield of decided cases.
The proceedings instituted in SSA v. Goodman 134 by the De
partment of Health and Human Services (HHS) against SSA Judge
Robert W. Goodman is a prototype that warrants explication. The
charge against Judge Goodman by the Office of Hearings and Ap
peals of the Social Security Administration, filed on April 23, 1982,
was that:
130. Id.
131. In re Glover, 2 M.S.P.B. 73 (1980) (recommended decision) (memorandum
opinion and order, 2 M.S.P.B. 71 (1980».
132. Id. at 80.
133. Id.;/n re Glover, 2 M.S.P.B. 71, 72 (1980) (memorandum opinion and order).
134. No. HQ75218210015 (MSPB Apr. 6, 1983) (recommended decision), rev'd,
No. HQ75218210015 (MSPB Feb. 6, 1984).
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Goodman's productivity level is, and has been for some time,
unacceptably low. This inefficiency in the conduct of his official
duties, resulting from his failure to increase his output to a mini
mally acceptable level of productivity, has contributed to undue
delays experienced by claimants awaiting a hearing decision
under section 205(b) of the Social Security Act and is detrimental
to the efficiency of the service. l3S

The charge equated "inefficiency" with "unacceptably low"
productivity, and "for good cause" with "inefficiency" in the conduct
of official duties and detriment to "efficiency of the service." His
productivity was deemed "unacceptably low" because his 1980 aver
age of 15.6 dispositions per month was far below the average of 30
dispositions per month maintained by all the SSA judges who were
on duty during the fiscal year. For fiscal year 1981 Goodman's aver
age was 15.8 dispositions per month compared with an average of 32
for all SSA judges. In addition to his "unacceptably low" disposi
tion rate, Goodman was alleged also to have "failed to carry a mini
mally acceptable workload." His annual average monthly
"pending" for 1981 was 64 compared with 178 for all SSA judges.
This placed an "unfair, unwarranted burden on the other adminis
trative law judges and delays the processing of all social security
claims within the hearing office."136
Goodman maintained that the complaint should be dismissed
on three primary grounds: the action subjected him to a "perform
ance rating" contrary to APA's section 4301(2)(0);137 it violated the
Act's "for good cause" standard codified in section 7521;138 and it
violated the 1978 settlement agreement executed by SSA after the
challenge by administrative law judges to establishment of workload
goals in Bono v. United States Social Security Administration .139
Even if standards could legally be established to measure the per
135. Id. at A-I app. ("Details of the Charge Against Judge Goodman") (Reidy, J.,
recommended decision).
136. Id. at A-2 app.
137. 5 U.S.c. § 4301(2)(0) (1982).
138. Id. § 7521.
139. Civ. No. 77-0819-CV-W-4 (W.O. Mo. 1979). Judge Bono filed the Brief of
the Association of Administrative Law Judges and Request for Opponunity to Panici
pate in Oral Hearing in suppon of Judge Goodman, August 25, 1983. Not surprisingly,
he contended, inter alia, that the SSA's acts leading to and culminating in the filing of the
charges against Judge Goodman were "in violation of specific provisions of the APA, the
Federal OPM Personnel Regulations penaining to [administrative law judges], and the
agency's acknowledged policy of prohibiting announcements of quotas or goals of pro
duction to [administrative law judges] in its employ, and its agreement entered into in
July 1979 to refrain from establishing quotas and goals in numbers." Brief at 14, Bono.
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formance of administrative law judges, the complaint was defective,
according to Goodman, because no standard had ever been submit
ted for approval to the Office of Personnel Management or has ever
been made known to him. l40
A hearing on the charges was held before MSPB Administrative
Law Judge Edward J. Reidy over five days in September and Octo
ber 1982, and Judge Reidy issued his "recommended decision" on
April 6, 1983. 141 Reidy rejected Goodman's contentions as to the
legitimacy and validity of the action against him. The MSPB judge
proceeded by recommending that Goodman be removed from serv
ice as an administrative law judge because his persistent inefficiency
as manifested by a production record far below average and by his
failure to improve it or to offer a satisfactory explanation for it, con
. stituted "good cause" for removal. Judge Reidy suggested at the
same time that Goodman be retained as an HHS employee but that
he be transferred to a position better suited to his skills. Although he
couched his conclusions in the "belief that respondent's position is
one of distinction and authority, not of subservience and that, if any
thing, his obligations are greater, not lesser, on account of his sta
tus,"142 Judge Reidy rejected quickly Judge Goodman's arguments
that APA's sections 4301(2)(0) and 7521 were violated by proceed
ing against him based upon performance-related grounds rather
than conduct-related grounds. Admitting that Judge Goodman was
"industrious," "conscientious," "articulate" and "conducts his hear
ings in a professional manner," 143 Reidy found, nonetheless, that
striking the necessary balance between judicial independence and ju
dicial accountability, consistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in
Ramspeck, required rejection of the "attenuated interpretation" of
"for good cause" pressed by Goodman. "Good cause is not analo
gous to good behavior."I44 Nothing in section 7521 prevents action
against an administrative law judge "merely because the action is
performance based."14s Given the language of section 4301(2)(D),
Judge Goodman's performance "cannot be measured against any
standards or critical elements that are performance standards which
form the basis for determining unacceptable performance under
Chapter 43;" but "his performance may properly be considered to
140. Goodman, No. HQ75218210015, slip op. at 6 (recommended decision).
141. Id.
142. !d. at 20 n.9.
143. Id. at 20.
144. Id. at 22.
145. Id. at 32.
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ascertain whether he had been so inefficient that good cause for his
removal has been manifested under [section] 7521."146
In concluding that performance-related removals pursuant to
chapter 75, as distinguished from Chapter 43, have been upheld,
Judge Reidy cited two 1982 Court of Appeals decisions, Drew v. De
partment ojthe Navy 147 and Darby v. IRS 148 without further discus
sion. "What this complaint involves, I conclude, is a performance
related charge filed consistent with the 'only for good cause' provi
sions of [section] 7521"; the complaint "is not rooted in a perform
ance evaluation or rating tied to specified criteria established in an
agency performance appraisal system within the contemplation of
Chapter 43 actions."149
With regard to the Bono settlement, Judge Reidy first ques
tioned whether the MSPB was "the forum wherein the power to er.
force that settlement resides"; ISO but then, assuming arguendo that it
was, he found "no desecration of that agreement." The key para
graph in the settlement provided that SSA's Office of Hearings and
Appeals (OHA) "will not issue directives or memoranda setting any
specific number of dispositions by [administrative law judges] as
quotas or goals."151 Reidy found that the complaint against Good
man was not for failure to make a specific number of dispositions as
quotas or goals, but for failure to improve his yield, given ample
time and encouragement. 152 Goodman's persistently low productiv
ity, not his failure to meet a particular level of dispositions per
month, was what had placed him "in a category of [administrative
law judges] whose work habits and production shortcomings war
ranted exploration" and, after sustained failure to improve or to of
fer an adequate explanation for not improving, made him one of
four SSA judges against whom charges were brought. ls3
Having determined that performance-related charges could
constitute good cause for removal under section 7521, Judge Reidy
focused on the standard of proof necessary to establish good cause.
He construed the MSPB's ruling in In re Chocallo, 154 albeit a con
146. Id.
147. 672 F.2d 197 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
148. 672 F.2d 192 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
149. Goodman, No. HQ75218210015. slip op. at 33 (recommended decision).
150. Id. at 27.
151. Id. (quoting the 1978 settlement agreement. see supra notes 136-38 and ac
companying text).
152. Id. at 29.
153. Id. at 29-30.
154. 2 M.S.P.B. 23 (1980); see supra text accompanying notes 122-30.
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duct case on its facts, to signal and approve of removal actions
grounded on charges of inefficiency and to require the showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that any judge proceeded against was
not "merely sub-par or imperfect," but manifested "substantial and
identifiable deficiencies."lss Applied to Goodman,
it must be established that his productivity is so unacceptly low
such that the Board is entirely satisfied that the showing made
warrants removal in the interest of promoting the efficiency of the
service. Anything less than a serious deficiency or a compelling
showing as a grounds for dismissal would not only fall shy of good
cause but smack of an impermissible intrusion into the indepen
dence of [administrative law judgesJ.ls6

Judge Reidy reviewed low productivity, lack of adequate justifi
cation and failure to improve even slightly through counseling and
offers of assistance, and noted that Goodman's "supervisors have
lost confidence in his ability to perform adequately the duties of his
position."ls7 Taking notice that Goodman's answers at the hearing
were "in more detail than the questions required and more wordy
than the interrogator desired,"ls8 Judge Reidy concluded that, given
its swollen workload, Goodman's inability to meet the growing de
mands of the job was a burden the agency could not efficiently en
dure. While he encouraged HHS "to ascertain if there might be
another assignment whereby the skills and diligence of Judge Good
man might be utilized,"ls9 he still urged the MSPB to
enter an order finding that the preponderant evidence forcefully
shows that respondent's productivity level has been unacceptably
low revealing inefficiency in the conduct of his official duties so as
to warrant the removal of Robert W. Goodman from employment
with the federal government, and that such removal will promote
the efficiency of the service. l60

The MSPB set oral argument for September 22, 1983 for its
hearing in the Goodman case. 161 The agency's Notice of Hearing
instructed participants that briefs submitted should be limited to
four issues, two of which focused on the Board's authority and dis
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Goodman, No. HQ75218210015, slip op. at 34 (recommended decision).
Id.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 36 n.l7.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 44.
48 Fed. Reg. 33,946-47 (July 26, 1983).
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cretion to specify the sanction to be applied when "good cause" had
been found under section 7521. The two key issues bearing on the
content and application of "for good cause" were:
What is the relationship, if any, of the "good cause" standard of
[section] 7521(a) to the "efficiency of the service" standard of [sec
tion] 7513 and/or to the "good behavior" standard of Article III of
the [United States] Constitution? If low productivity may consti
tute good cause for removal of an administrative law judge, what
evidence must the employing agency introduce in order to meet its
burden of proof? 162

Counsel for Judge Goodman-John Bodner, Albert Cornelison
and Lewis Barr of Howrey and Simon-repeated the earlier argu
ments that the charges were disguised performance ratings of admin
istrative law judges and thus forbidden by law; that they violated the
Bono settlement; and that, even assuming "inefficiency" could be
"good cause," the conclusion that Goodman was inefficient was un
supported by any preponderance of the evidence. In addition, coun
sel contended that Goodman was denied due process in the hearing
before Judge Reidy by virtue of being precluded from litigating fully
the issue of inefficiency. They also urged that dismissal was much
too severe a penalty, in any event, because Goodman "served with
distinction for more than a decade, . . . [had] never been criticized
for the handling of a single case, [had] followed OHA's own guide
lines for [administrative law judges] and [had] sought only to assure
that claimants receive the full and fair hearings and the adequate
written decisions required by law."163 Finally, they cited this
writer's testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Governmen
tal Affairs for the proposition that administrative law judges perform
judicial functions that parallel within the administrative process the
roles of our other federal judges within the broader governmental
process and warrant similar protection against pressures and
influences. 164
On the issue of the evidence that must be introduced if low pro
162. Id. at 33,946.
163. Respondent's Request to Participate in Oral Argument and Supporting Mem
orandum at 3, Goodman.
164. Id. at II (citing Rosenblum testimony, Social Security Disability Reviews: TIre
Role of the Administrative Law Judge: Hearing Before the Subcommillee on Oversight
Management of the Senate Commillee on Governmental Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 91
92 (1983) [hereinafter Report]. The Subcommittee reached the conclusion that ''The [ad
ministrative law judge] is the only impartial, independent adjudicator available to the
claimant in the administrative process and the only person who stands between the
claimant and the whim of agency bias and policy." Repor/, at 38.
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ductivity legitimately could be deemed "good cause," counsel for
Goodman insisted, citing Professor Mashaw's studies of Social Se
curity Hearings andAppeals 16S and Bureaucratic Justice 166 as key au
thorities, that there must be some objective, pre-formulated standard
against which to judge an administrative law judge's performance,167
Counsel maintained that "OHA should have conducted a study, or
compiled empirical support to show that Judge Goodman was in
deed inefficient."168 Goodman's actual case production rate was "un
fairly compared with an abstract national average statistical rate," 169
which was "skewed" against Judge Goodman because it was "de
rived, in large measure, from the output of high-producing [adminis
trative law judges] who [did] not properly fulfill their duties as
[administrative law judges]."17o In any event, Goodman's counsel
urged, the agency must notify its judges regarding case production
standards by which their productivity will be measured, and must be
reasonably responsive to the requests and suggestions of the admin
istrative law judge for assistance in raising his or her production rate.
Goodman's request for a second hearing assistant, instead of a deci
sion writer as most administrative law judges were given, was ig
nored, except for one brief interim period. l7l
The brief filed by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)
was especially interesting because, while it concurred in Judge
Reidy's finding "that the complainant [had] instituted proper re
moval actions against respondent and that good cause was estab
lished to warrant respondent's removal from his position of
administrative law judge pursuant to [section] 7521,"172 it also as
serted as "inappropriate" the removal of administrative law judges
pursuant to an "efficiency ofthe service standard."173 Decisions like
Ramspeck "clearly differentiate subordinate and semi-independent
administrative law judges from life tenured federal judges." Simi
165. J. MASHAW, SSA HEARINGS AND ApPEALS (1978).
166. J. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE (1983).
167. Respondent's Request to Participate in Oral Argument and Supporting Mem
orandum, at 12-15, Gooliman. Invoked in particular was Professor Mashaw's statement
that: "If the quality of performance is to be judged, there obviously must be some stan
dard against which to judge it. The more specific and objective the goals of the organiza
tion can be made, the easier it will be to determine whether or not performance meets
expectations." Iii. at 12 (quoting J. MAsHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 149 (1983».
168. Iii.
169. Iii. at 13.
170. Iii. To the same effect see ill. at 13 n.3, 15 n.7.
171. /d. at 15-16.
172. Brief of Office of Personnel Management at 3, Goodman.
173. Iii. at 14.
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larly, the "good cause" and "efficiency of the service" standards were
"developed independent of one another."174 The OPM brief did not
undertake to analyze the compatibility with these legal views of
Judge Reidy's invocations of "efficiency of the service" concomi
tantly or exchangeably with "good cause."
The Merit Systems Protection Board issued a unanimous final
decision in the Goodman case on February 6, 1984, ruling that the
"record in this case does not reveal the existence of good cause."17S
Although the Board determined that "there is no generic prohi
bition to the filing of this charge,"176 and did not employ terms of
endearment to evaluate "the unreasonably methodical manner in
which the respondent handled his cases," 177 it concluded that the
agency's evidence "did not prove the agency's charge that respon
dent had failed to achieve a minimally acceptable level of productiv
ity."178 That Judge Goodman's case dispositions were shown to
have been half the national average was not adequate proof of unac
ceptably low productivity "[i]n the absence of evidence demonstrat
ing the validity of using its statistics to measure comparative
productivity." 179 Especially in light of agency acknowledgement
that its cases "did vary in difficulty" and "are not fungible,"lso na
tion-wide case disposition averages could not be relied upon as
guides for measuring reasonable productivity. "Where, as here the
agency's entire case rests upon comparative statistics, proof of their
validity is an essential element of the agency's case."ISI
Issues identical to those raised before the MSPB in the Good
man case have been raised in Federal court litigation,ls2 and in an
other MSPB case against an SSA judge, SSA v. Balaban .IS3
Stanley M. Balaban, an SSA judge in the Long Beach, Califor
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id.
SSA v. Goodman, No. HQ75210015, slip op. at 19 (MSPB Feb. 6, 1984).
Id. at 15.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 17.
180. Id. at 18.
181. Id. at 19.
182. Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d \0 (2d Cir. 1980), raised such issues but only the
question of standing has been resolved thus far. Examples of pending cases are Nash v.
Heckler, Civ. No. 78-281 (W.D.N.Y. filed May 30,1978) and Association of Admin. Law
Judges v. Heckler, No. 83-0124 (D.D.C. heard Mar. 5, 1984). See also Judge Simon
Nash's observations on these issues in his Brief by Intervenor in Support of Respondent.
Goodman.
183. No. HQ752812100014 (MSPB Feb. 22. 1983). cerro denied. \03 S. Ct. 128
(1983).
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nia office was, like Goodman, charged with an "unacceptably low
level of productivity" in fiscal years 1980, 1981 and part of 1982, as
compared with the average number of dispositions by all administra
tive law judges in the Social Security Administration. l84 In rejecting
Balaban's motion to dismiss, which challenged the legitimacy of re
moval proceedings based on performance ratings under sections
4301(2)(0) and 5721 and contended the proceeding against him vio
lated the Bono settlement 185 (as had Goodman),186 MSPB Judge
John J. McCarthy phrased the agency's burden of proof slightly dif
ferently than did Judge Reidy in his recommended decision in the
Goodman case. Judge Reidy placed the burden on the agency to
establish, by a "preponderance of the evidence," that the administra
tive law judge failed to increase his unacceptably low productivity
after notice and opportunity.187 Judge Reidy subsequently inte
grated the preponderance test with satisfaction by the MSPB "that
the showing made warrants removal in the interest of promoting the
efficiency of the service."188 Judge McCarthy maintained that the
"good cause" requirement for actions against administrative law
judges was "similar" to the "efficiency of the service" standard appli
cable to other federal employees,189 but he avoided classifying the
standard of proof as a "preponderance of the evidence." Rather, he
seemed to favor requiring, an "obvious and severe" test for perform
ance failure that warranted a conclusion the administrative law
judge was "grossly incompetent or inefficient."I90
In order to draw the requisite line between acceptable and unac
ceptable administrative law judge performance, the MSPB required
"evidence of the nature and difficulty of the work and the conditions
affecting the productivity of ORA judges," McCarthy maintained. 191
A "simplistic answer" to the question of when the level of perform
ance should be c-.onsidered unsatisfactory would be that
removal of less efficient judges and retention of only the more pro
184. His 1980 average was 18.2 cases per month. 15.3 in 1981. and 13.2 in the first
five months in 1982. By comparison. the national monthly average was 30 cases in 1980
and 32 in 1981. Id. at 3.
185. Id. at 16-17.
186. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
187. Goodman. No. HQ75218210015. slip op. at 17 (recommended decision).
188. Balaban. No. HQ752812100014. slip op. at 34. Judge Reidy reiterated appli
cability of the preponderance requirement and relevance of the efficiency of the service
standard at the end of his recommended decision. Id. at 43-44.
189. Id. at 10.
190. Id. at IS.
191. Id.
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ductive judges would increase "the efficiency of the service" and
satisfy the "good cause" requirement of section 7521. But such an
approach to the issue would not take into account the concept of
independence which all the interested parties acknowledge to be
an important factor. A more valid approach, reasonable in fact
and in law, might require a "strong" showing of inefficiency to
justify the extreme sanction of removal. Arguably, the failure in
performance, i.e., low productivity, should be so obvious and se
vere as to warrant the conclusion, absent some other explanation,
that the administrative law judge is grossly incompetent or
inefficient. 192

In addition to the possible differences between MSPB Judges
Reidy and McCarthy on burden of proof, their equality of certitude
in dismissing the respective SSA judges' challenges to the legality of
the proceedings against them was tempered by a difference between
their interpretations of precedent for the actions. McCarthy's rejec
tion of Balaban's claims that the APA and Civil Service Reform
Act 193 barred performance-related actions to remove administrative
law judges was based primarily on his acceptance as applicable pre
cedent of the MSPB's language in the Chocallo "mis-behavior" re
moval case}94 McCarthy then appended to his invocation of
Chocallo the finding:
While the principle of independence must be respected when per
formance-based reasons are advanced to justify removal or disci
plinary action, the mere realization that an agency may propose to
the Board that such an action be taken does not of itself constitute
such a threat to independence as to warrant a general rule holding
such a proposal to be contrary to law or otherwise barred}95

McCarthy nonetheless acknowledged that "research of cases arising
under [section] 7521 discloses no case in which either the Board or a
192. Id.
193. 5 U.S.C. § 1101 (1982).
194. Construing Chocal/o, Judge McCarthy maintained:
While the case was essentially one involving misbehavior of an administrative
law judge in performing adjudicatory functions, the Board recognized the ten
sion that arises between the need to keep the judge free of improper agency
inftuences and the responsibility of the employing agency to institute discipli
nary or removal action before the Board for the good of the Government serv
ice. The Board stated that 'a careful balance must be created between judicial
independence and judicial accountability' . . . . (T)he board ruled that the fact
that duties are being carried out within a hearing room rather than an office
'does not provide an impenetrable shield from appraisal of performance.'
Id. at 11-12 (quoting In re CbocaUo, 2 M.S.P.B. 20, 21 (1980».
195. Id. at 13.
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court has addressed the specific question of whether low productivity
can justify the dismissal of an administrative law judge." 196
Reidy also invoked the MSPB's language in the Chocallo case
in the course of his recommended decision to justify removal for per
formance-based reasons. He added that the complaint against
Goodman was "a performance-related charge filed consistent with
the 'only for good cause' provisions of [section] 752l.and not prohib
ited by any law or regulation."197 For support, he relied upon the
court of appeals' 1982 decisions in Drew v. United States Department
of the Navy 198 and Darby v. IRSl99 which upheld the "use of Chap
ter 75 procedures for performance based removals," as distinguished
from chapter 43 procedures. 2OO
The Drew and Darby decisions of the District of Columbia Cir
cuit did indeed hold that removal proceedings under chapter 75 were
separate and distinct from such proceedings under chapter 43; both
cases having upheld removals of federal personnel pursuant to chap
ter 75 after termination of proceedings for "unacceptable perform
ance" pursuant to chapter 43. 201 But citing these cases to support
performance-based actions against administrative law judges re
quires an intermediate step that even OPM declined to take. 202 It
requires equating the "good cause" standard with the "efficiency of
the service" standard, because Drew and Darby involved proceed
ings, not under section 7521 which requires the "for good cause"
standard, but under section 7513 which requires resort to the "effi
ciency of the service" standard. The court of appeals ruled 2-1 in
both cases that the agency had shown by a preponderance of the
evidence that removal of the employee "would promote the effi
ciency of the service."203
Given this explicit tie of the Drew and Darby rulings to the "ef
ficiency of the service" standard, the only precedent for the proposi
196. Id. at 11.
197. Goodman, No. HQ75218210015, slip op. at 33 (recommended decision).
198. 672 F.2d 197 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
199. 672 F.2d 192 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
200. Id. at 195-96. Under chapter 43, agencies are required to establish perform
ance appraisal systems and are authorized to take action against employees for "unac
ceptable performance." 5 U.S.C. §§ 4302, 4303 (1982). Administrative law judges are
excepted from chapter 43 by 5 U.S.C. § 4301(2)(E) (1982). The "for good cause" stan
dard for administrative law judges of section 7521 is under chapter 75, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501
7543 (1982).
201. Drew, 672 F.2d at 200-01; Darby, 672 F.2d at 195-96.
202. See generally Brief of U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Goodman.
203. Drew, 672 F.2d at 201; Darby, 672 F.2d at 196.
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tion that performance-related charges can be found to constitute
"good cause" in a removal proceeding under section 7521 prior to
Goodman, is the language in the course of the Chocallo opinion by
the MSPB, which avowedly was a "misbehavior" case. 204 While it
certainly remains correct as a general rule that an agency's construc
tion of the statute Congress has charged it to administer is entitled to
deference, contemporaneity of the construction with adoption of the
statute is a key justification for the deference. Whether a first-time
construction by the agency, more than 30 years after adoption of the
statute, qualifies for deference or invites disdain, is an open
question. 20s
The degree of deference that the MSPB's quoted language in
Chocallo warrants should be dependent upon the relevance of that
language to the facts and ruling in the case, the contemporaneity of
the language with adoption of the statute, and the consistency of that
language with positions, if any, previously taken by the agency on
the point at issue. Regarding the last of these factors, issues of unsat
204. See supra note 194. On appeal of the MSPB's decision, the United States
District Coun for the District of Columbia maintained, in upholding the MSPB, that "an
administrative law judge is not immune from review for procedural misconduct, incom
petence or other failings in the performance of his or her duties." Chocallo v. Prokop,
No. 80-1053, slip op. at 3 (D.D.C. Oct. 10, 1980), offd, vacated, and remanded, No. 80
2518 (D.C. Cir. Feb. II, 1982) (unpublished). According to MSPB Judge McCanhy, the
remand was for the district coun to explain its dismissal of plaintiffs claims in constitu
tional ton. The district coun dismissed those claims again by order dated May 3, 1982,
accompanied by a memorandum opinion. Order denying Balaban motion to dismiss,
Balaban, slip op. at 11 n.ll (MSPB Feb. 22, 1983).
205. In Bob Jones Univ. v. United States. 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983), Chief Justice
Burger, in upholding IRS denial of tax exempt status to private schools that practice
racial discrimination, noted of the IRS interpretation that hadn't been announced until
1970, "That it may be seen as belated docs not undermine its soundness." fd. at 2030.
Although this statement by the Coun seems at odds with the author's position in the text,
the Coun justified the "belated" interpretation of I.R.C. § 501(C)(3)(1982) by the IRS on
the ground that
racial discrimination. . . is contrary to public policy. . . . Indeed, it would be
anomalous for the Executive, Legislative and Judicial Branches to reach con
clusions that add up to a firm public policy on racial discrimination, and at the
same time have the IRS blissfully ignore what all three branches of the Federal
Government had declared.
fd. at 2030-32. No similar "firm public policy" is evident to require an administrative
interpretation that the performance related charges against Judge Goodman are "good
cause" for administrative law judge removal under section 7521.
The Supreme Coun's explanation for denying deference to the NLRB's belated con
struction beginning in 1970 that faculty members are "employees" entitled to the protec
tion of the National Labor Relations Act seems more consonant with the situation under
discussion. "[W)e accord great respect to the expenise of the Board," said Justice Powell.
"when its conclusions are rationally based on aniculated facts and consistent with the
Act." NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 691 (1980).
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isfactory productivity as "good cause" were before the MSPB for the
first time in the Goodman and Balaban cases, and had not previously
been argued before that agency or its predecessor, the Civil Service
Commission. Nonetheless, there is at least a question whether the
Civil Service Commission previously looked with favor on the posi
tion, a position compatible with Goodman's and Balaban's argu
ments, that "good cause" removals are confined to disciplinary
infractions.
In Benton v. United States,206 a court of claims proceedings in
volving the question whether a hearing examiner who was involun
tarily retired for disability was "removed" within the meaning of
section 11 of the APA and hence subject to the APA's procedural
protections, the Civil Service Commission argued that there was a
clear distinction between a removal for good cause and a separation
based on an involuntary retirement for disability. According to the
court of claims' report of the case, the Commission, in implementing
its argument for this distinction, maintained that removal for cause
"denotes a disciplinary type of action, whereas involuntary retire
ment is viewed as a non-disciplinary type of action."207 A judge
could be involuntarily retired, the Commission maintained, without
being accorded APA procedural protections. The court of claims re
jected the Commission's dichotomy and ruled that disability could
constitute good cause for removal of hearing examiners. Because in
voluntary retirement as a result of disability was "removal", the dis
ability must be established through the procedures prescribed by the
APA, which, for administrative law judges, was ''wholly different
from that applicable to 'mere employees of an agency'. . . ."208 The
court of claims concluded: "We cannot agree with defendant that
the term 'removal for good cause' has become a term of art in legal
parlance and that in every case and in every statute relating to civil
ian employees of the [gJovernment, it means a removal for discipli
nary reasons."209
Given the peripheral status of the allegedly supportive language
in Chocallo to the facts of the case, the uncertainty about consistency
between the current position of the agency on the scope of "good
cause" and the position of its predecessor agency a decade earlier,
and the exposition of the agency's present construction three decades
206. 488 F.2d 1017 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
207. Id. at 1024.
208. Id. at 1025.
209. Id.
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after formulation of the statute, there is little ground for deferring to
the MSPB's interpretation. The core issue is not solely one of defer
ence in any event, for a cluster of interrelated factors bear upon ac
cepting and applying performance-related standards as good cause
for removal: essentially statutory and judicial texts and contexts of
the good cause standard in conjunction with an evaluation of how
the standard's underlying objectives can most effectively be served.

v.

GUIDELINES FOR DEFINING "GOOD CAUSE"

The foregoing examination of legislative history, professional
commentary and arguments before, and opinions by, courts regard
ing the standard for removal of administrative law judges, indicates
that the meaning of "for good cause" is plainer in terms of relation
ships to comparable standards along a spectrum of strictness than it
is in terms of descriptions of formal contents. In prescribing the stan
dard to govern removal of administrative law judges, Congress es
chewed both the strict constitutional standard of "good behavior"
required for removal of federal judges and the loose standard of
"such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service"; the latter
standard authorized traditionally for removal of non-judicial federal
civil service personne1. 210 The obvious inference to be drawn from
Congress' eliminating the "efficiency of the service" standard and
adopting instead the noun "cause," as used in the traditional civil
service standard, and combining it with the same adjective, "good,"
as used in the constitutional standard, is that more than mere
"cause" that promotes the "efficiency of the service" was to be re
quired for removal of administrative law judges. At the same time,
less than noxious conduct falling afoul of "good behavior" was to be
required. Removal of administrative law judges was not tied exclu
sively to their behavior. As the Ramspeck case made clear,2l1 re
moval could be ordered legitimately as a consequence of economic
traumas such as reductions in force. Presumably, other salient oc
currences, whose impact on the administrative process exceeds "effi
ciency of the service" by a sufficient margin to be the equivalent of
economic trauma, could also qualify as "good cause."
210. "The efficiency of the service" standard was adopted in 1912 as section 6 of
the lloyd-LaFollette Act, providing "[tJhat no person in the classified civil service of the
United States shall be removed therefrom except for such cause as will promote the effi
ciency of said service and for reasons given in writing..." 37 Stat. 539. 555 (1912). The
Supreme Court upheld the standard against a claim of voidness for vagueness in Arnett
v. Kennedy. 416 U.S. 134, 158-64 (1974).
211. See supra notes 54-81 and accompanying text.
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The AP A increased the protection of hearing examiners from
what it had been previously, as the Senate Report made plain, in an
attempt to render them "independent and secure in their tenure and
compensation," thus taking "a different ground than the present situ
ation, in which examiners are mere employees of the
agency. . . ."212
The "different ground than the present situation" necessary to
establish "good cause" for hearing examiner removals had to be
stricter than that necessary to establish "such cause as will promote
the efficiency of the service"; "mere employees" already were enti
tled to that level of protection in "the present situation." No verbal
alchemy can transmute the "good cause" standard into the stricter
"good behavior" standard; the prohibition is equally compelling
upon replacement of legal with prestidigitory techniques to pummel
"good cause" into the looser "such cause as will promote the effi
ciency of the service."
How can the good cause standard be interpreted and applied in
practice without confining it to purely behavioral delicts that would
make it the equivalent, in effect, of the good behavior standard and
without expanding it to encompass every inadequacy in performance
that warrants removal to promote the efficiency of the service? Some
matters not yet discussed, including the Administrative Conference's
1978 resolution on SSA-administrative law judge interactions,213
Judge Merritt Ruhlen's ManuaPI4 for administrative law judges, the
Supreme Court's 1983 decision in Campbell v. Heckler 215 and recent
research by the Center for Judicial Conduct Organizations,216 con
sidered in conjunction with the earlier analyses of cases, commenta
ries and contexts can assist in establishing guidelines and monitoring
borders.
Resolution 78-2 adopted by the Administrative Conference in
1978 limned three avenues to improvement of agency-judge relation
ships in the realm of social security disability claims. Terming its
recommendations "interstitial and conservative," the Administrative
Conference endeavored to "prescribe improvements while reinforc
ing sound practice."217 Relevant to the particular concerns of .this
212. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22. at 215.
213. Administrative Conference of the U.S., Res. 78-2, I C.F.R. § 305.78-2 (1982).
214. M. RUHLEN, MANUAL FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES (rev. ed. 1982).
215. 103 S. Ct. 1952 (1983).
216. Letter to the author from Center for Judicial Conduct Organizations, Ameri
can Judicature Society (Sept. 9, 1983).
217. I C.F.R. § 305.78-2, at 99.
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paper were:
Recommendations 78-2A2: The Bureau of Hearings and Appeals
(BHA) possesses and should exercise the authority, consistent with
the admjnjstrative law judge's decisional independence, to pre
scribe procedures and techniques for the accurate and expeditious
disposition of Social Security Administration claims. Mter con
sultation with its administrative law judge corps, the Civil Service
Commission and other affected interests, BHA should establish by
regulation the agency's expectations concerning the administrative
law judges' performance. Maintaining the administrative law
judges' decisional independence does not preclude the articulation
of appropriate productivity norms or efforts to secure adherence to
previously enunciated standards and policies, underlying the So
cial Security Administration's fulfillment of statutory duties.
78-2B4: The Bureau of Hearings and Appeals should make better
use [of] claimants as sources of information by: (a) providing
them with available State agency reasons for denial; (b) providing
notice of the critical issues to be canvassed at the hearing; and
(c) engaging in careful and detailed questioning of the claimant at
the hearing.
78·2C2: The Social Security Administration should devote more
attention to the development and dissemination of precedent
materials. These actions include (a) regulatory codification of set
tled or established policies (b) reasoned acquiescence or nonacqui
escence in judicial decisions (c) publication of fact-based
precedent decisions (d) periodic conferences of administrative law
judges for discussion of new legal developments or recurrent
problems. 218

Thus, the Conference looked with favor on the articulation of
appropriate productivity norms, provided that such norms should be
established "by regulation" and posited on consultations with ad
ministrative law judges and other affected interests. There is no evi
dence in any of the proceedings against SSA judges that appropriate
productivity norms have ever been articulated, let alone "by regula
tion" or "after consultation" with administrative law judges. The
other integrative and practicable recommendations for codification
of precedents and use of claimants for information in a manner that
could systematize and simplify many disability cases have encoun
tered recurrent neglect as well. SSA has responded, on the whole,
with insularity and opacity to the Administrative Conference's pro
posal for a consultative, cooperative endeavor.
218. [d. at 99-100.
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Judge Merritt Ruhlen's Manualfor Administrative Law Judges,
published by the Administrative Conference, treated administrative
law judges' obligations to apply agency policy determinations as en
tirely compatible with maintaining their decisional independence.
He noted that "[ilt is the mudge's duty to decide all cases in accord
ance with agency policy."219 Nonetheless, if evidence or arguments
not previously considered by the agency are introduced "or if there
are facts or circumstances indicating that reconsideration of estab
lished agency policy may be necessary, the mudge has not only a
right but a duty to consider such matters and rule accordingly."220
Ruhlen described administrative law judge appointments as "abso
lute" in order to insure independence, though he also recognized
that the judge is "an employee of the agency, charged with the inter
pretation and enforcement of its policies and the achievement of its
distinct mission. . . ."221 He stressed that the administrative law
judge has a "strong affirmative duty" both "to try a case fairly and to
write a sound decision" and "to insure that an accurate and complete
record is developed."222
The latter obligation extends, when necessary, to directing
counsel to research questions of law or policy and directing the par
ties "to discuss in oral argument, in brief, or in special memoranda
during the hearing any issues or points he thinks germane. . . ."223
He may even "have to call his own witness upon essential matters
not covered adequately by the parties."224 In writing opinions, ad
ministrative law judges must be aware that "the only way to write
any document is to assemble the relevant material and the diction
ary, thesaurus, style-book and guide to citation, and to write, rewrite,
rewrite and rewrite."22S
The clear intimation from Ruhlen's observations is that the ad
ministrative law judge who reworks and rewrites decisions to im
prove them is performing his obligations properly and is not by so
doing, furnishing "good cause" for dismissal. Nothing in the record
of the proceedings to remove the SSA judges indicates that their per
formance was appraised with regard to insuring that "an accurate
219. M. RUHLEN, supra note 214, at 79.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1.
222. Id. at 3.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 95.
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and complete record is developed."226
Ruhlen's views of the responsibilities of administrative law
judges were reinforced by the views of the Supreme Court in Camp
bell v. Heck/er227 in 1983. In reversing the court of appeals' conclu
sion that a finding by the Secretary of HHS that the claimant was
"not disabled" was not supported by substantial evidence unless the
Secretary showed "suitable available alternative jobs" for the claim
ant,228 the Supreme Court maintained that the court of appeals re
lied upon a principle of administrative law that was "inapplicable"
when the agency, as here, had promulgated valid regulations. 229
When an agency takes administrative or official notice of facts, a
litigant must ordinarily be given an adequate opportunity to re
spond. 230 "But when the accuracy of those facts already has been
tested fairly during rulemaking, the rulemaking proceeding itself
provides sufficient procedural protection."23. Reasons why the Sec
retary could choose to rely upon guidelines developed through
rulemaking rather than to present testimony of a vocational expert in
each case were that the regulations provide that "the rules will be
applied only when they describe a claimant's abilities and limitations
accurately" and that the regulations require the administrative law
judge to " 'loo[k] fully into the issues.' "232 The Secretary conceded
that the regulations require conscientious inquiry by the administra
tive law judge but argued that the inquiry undertaken by the judge
here "satisfied any regulatory duty."233
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Brennan commented that
claimant's hearing before the administrative law judge "reflects
poorly" on the judge's "duty of inquiry" and noted that the Secre
tary acknowledged this duty. He did not support the court of ap
peals decision in the case, however, because ''the obligation that the
[c]ourt of [a]ppeals would have placed on [a]dministrative [l]aw
UJudges was a poor substitute for good faith performance of the
'duty of inquiry' they already have."234 Justice Marshall, the lone
226. It!. at 3.
227. 103 S. Ct. 1952 (1983).
228. Campbell v. Secretary, 665 F.ld 48,54 (ld Cir. 1981), rev'tl sub nom. Camp
bell v. Heckler, 103 S. Ct. 1952 (1983).
229. 103 S. Ct. at 1959.
230. It!. at 1958.
231. It!. at 1959.
232. It!. (invoking 20 C.F.R. § 404 (1982), especially §§ 404. 1563(a), 404.944, 404
subpart P, app. 2 § 200.00(a».
233. 103 S. Ct. at 1958 n.12.
234. It!. at 1960 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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dissenter, disagreed with the other justices' conclusion that the court
of appeals did not question the adequacy of the administrative law
judge's inquiry at the hearing. 23s
The Justices were unanimous in their perception of administra
tive law judges' responsibilities for inquiry and judgment. The Sec
retary could promulgate medical-vocational guidelines through
rulemaking in order to improve both the uniformity and efficiency of
determinations regarding the existence of suitable jobs in the na
tional economy. The Justices, in a footnote, recognized additional
support for the Secretary's guidelines that "[m]ore than a quarter of
a million of these claims require a hearing before an [a]dministrative
[l]aw UJudge. . . . [t]he need for efficiency is self evident."236 Effi
ciency was equated with avoiding previously inconsistent treatment
of similarly situated claimants that resulted from disparities in the
testimony of vocational experts. The use of rulemaking to formulate
guidelines in order to heighten uniformity in determining the avi
lability of work that claimants could perform was applauded by the
Court. By no stretch of the imagination could one find in the Court's
decision in Campbell, however, a scintilla of support for the proposi
tion that agencies can prescribe decisional minima to which adminis
trative law judges must adhere or face removal. The Justices
stressed thoroughness and fairness, not quantity, in reiterating the
obligation of administrative law judges to look conscientiously and
fully into the relevant issues and to refuse to apply the rules con
tained in the Secretary's guidelines upon finding that "they fail to
describe a claimant's particular limitations."237 Conscientiousness
and thoroughness in probing and weighing issues were seen by the
justices as positive components of administrative law judge perform
ance. To switch them into criteria for proving "good cause" for re
moval of administrative law judges would require that the semantic
standards of Big Brother in Orwell's 1984238 be substituted for tradi
tional evaluative norms.
Does the foregoing analysis suggest that judges can legitimately
mask indolence through talismanic allegations of conscientiousness
and thoroughness? Certainly not; for probes of the empirical reality
or falsity of such allegations are necessary and proper instruments in
assessing whether removal ofjudges is warranted. Studies ofjudicial
235. Id. at 1961 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting).
236. Id. at 1954 n.2.
237. Id. at 1958 n.ll.
238. G. ORWELL, 1984 (reprint 1982).
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discipline by the American Judicature Society demonstrate that the
time is past-if it ever existed-when judges could claim total immu
nity from accountability for their conduct and conscientiousness. 239
Research by the Society's Center for Judicial Conduct Organizations
evidences consistent rulings of removability and orders of removal
against judges shown to be delinquent in the performance of duties.
In a letter to this author on September 9, 1983 in response to a
request for "cases concerning judges who have been disciplined for
deciding too few cases or for delay in disposing of cases," American
Judicature Society Staff Attorney Terrence Brooks listed 25 such
cases, omitting from his compilation "cases where judges have been
accused of delay together with other, more serious misconduct."240
Perusal of the reports of the respective judicial conduct organizations
in each of these cases revealed that the judge subjected to discipline
failed in some respect beyond the charges leveled at Administrative
Law Judges Goodman and Balaban-a factor in addition to low de
cisional productivity was always present.
A case closest to the allegations against Goodman and Balaban
involved an Alabama circuit court judge who was found to be "men
tally unable to perform his duties," after "failing to promptly dispose
of cases submitted to him and failing to report cases pending deci
sion before him for more than six months."241 Typical of the charges
against the judge was the claim that he exacerbated delays by losing
decrees from time to time. For example, after hearing an automobile
condemnation case in January 1978, he requested and received a
proposed decree from an attorney in May 1978. He signed that de
cree in August 1978 but then lost it in his office for four months. It
was found in December 1978 and finally filed eleven months after
the hearing. 242 In other cases before that judge, attorneys "repeat
edly wrote letters and made phone calls" urging the judge to decide
239. See I. TESSITOR, JUDICIAL CONDUCT ORGANIZATIONS (1978). The American
Judicature Society's Center for Judicial Conduct Organizations publishes, The Judicial
Conduct Reporter, a quarterly newsletter, and The Judicial Discipline and Disability Di
gest, a multivolume work cataloging every reported case on judicial discipline since
1960. The November 1979 issue of Judicature was devoted to preserving confidence in
the Commissions, 63 JUDICATURE 203 (1979). With regard to application of the constitu
tional "good behavior" standard to federal judges, see R. WHEELER & A. LEVIN, JUDI
CtAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL IN THE U.S. (1979) (study of the Federal Judicial
Center).
240. See supra note 216.
241. In re Powers, slip op. at I (Ala. Ct. of the Judiciary July II, 1981) (unreported
judgment) (mimeo).
242. Id. at 5.
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submitted matters "but to no avail."243
While falling short of malicious, immoral, or venal behavior,
the performance of the Alabama judge, and of others removed or
disciplined in similar cases, included elements of negligence or indif
ference, such as losing or mislaying case materials, keeping inaccu
rate records and unwillingness or inability to discharge
administrative duties as presiding officer, in addition to a failure to
make timely adjudications. 244
Although the cases of judicial discipline contained some factor
of negligence or indifference in addition to low decisional productiv
ity on the part of the judge, reasonable persons journeying along the
slipperly slopes of legal argumentation would have to acknowledge
that decisional productivity can be so low as, without more, to con
stitute good cause for removal. It is submitted that an administrative
law judge who presides admirably over hearings and elicits every
relevant nuance of testimony and data, but who fails over a period of
time to produce any decisions, negates the title of judge and fur
nishes good cause for removal. Except perhaps, in Gilbert and Sulli
van operettas, one who cannot adjudicate cannot be a judge.
On the other hand, an administrative law judge who adjudicates
at a pace similar to that at which rabbits multiply could also furnish
good cause for removal if high quantity was achieved at the cost of
violating the duty of inquiry and failing to look fully into the issues.
Analysts of judicial performance should question rather than cheer
high disposition rates that exceed, over a period of time, likely com
patibility with full inquiry and deliberation. How should maximum
and minimum figures be determined for each agency so that a pre
sumption of good cause may appropriately be imposed for discipli
nary proceedings against administrative law judges whose
disposition rates fall above or below those figures? If it can be done
/d. at 7.
244. See, e.g.,1n re Heideman, 387 Mich. 630, 198 N.W.2d 291 (1972); In re Mac
Dowell, 303 N.Y.S.2d 748 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977); and In re Judges of Municipal Court,
256 Iowa 1135, 130 N.W.2d 553 (1964) cited by the Alabama court in the Powers casco
Typical of the other cases noted in the American Judicature Society Center for Judicial
Conduct Organizations' letter of September 9, 1983 were In re Zcdlar, (Pa. Mar. 1981)
(unreported order) (mimco) removing a District Justice of Cumberland County for such
conduct as refusing to conduct hearings on Mondays and after 11:00 A.M. on Tuesdays
through Fridays and for refusing to come to his office on a number of work days; and In
re Stafford, (N.Y. Judicial Conduct Comm'n Nov. 12 1982) (unreported judgment)
(mimco) removing a justice of Newfield Town Court for having "failed to carry out
virtually all her judicial dutics", including failure to preside over arraignments, trials and
other proceedings.
243.
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equitably at all, it must be the product of representative, expert judg
ment. Compatible with the Administrative Conference's Resolution
78-2, reliance upon consultations with representative judges, judicial
organizations and other experts from the profession are far more
likely to produce fair and feasible criteria than are decrees by agen
cies acting alone in sovereign isolation. It would be a mockery of the
vaunted methodology of administrative law to exclude from authori
tative participation representatives of the individuals and profes
sional groups most directly affected.
The setting, through consultations with representative experts,
of decisional productivity standards deemed consistent with full elic
itation and evaluation of testimony, data and arguments should be
the beginning not the end of inquiries into whether good cause has
been shown for dismissal of administrative law judges. The ade
quacy of support services available to meet particular judges' needs
for assistance must be a factor of consideration. Reasonable efforts
must be made by the agency to accommodate those needs in accord
ance with the judges' and not only the agency's perceptions. The
professional quality of the written decisions by the judges against
whom charges have been brought should also be appraised before
any conclusion of "good cause" is reached. Panels of impartial ex
perts selected from peer groups of administrative law judges, other
distinguished members of the bench and bar and from law school
faculties should be utilized to evaluate the quality of decisions by the
charged judges. High quality could explain low productivity and
would counsel against disciplinary action in those cases in which
judges are charged with consistently falling below minimally accept
able decisional outputs. Any judicial system that prizes quality
should have room for judges who, by observing the ''write, rewrite,
rewrite and rewrite" admonition of Ruhlen's manual,245 achieve
high levels of soundness and clarity. Such practices might play hob
with caseload disposition if all the judges were perfectionists; but the
same sense of reality that tells us that a judge who decides no cases
should not be entitled "judge" also tells us that few judges are ad
dicted to perfectionism. The few in service should be studied and
treasured, not purged. 246
245. M. RUHLEN, supra note 214, at 95.
246. Although there may well be points of divergence between the Board's analysis
of good cause in the Goodman case, see supra tellt accompanying notes 175-81, and that
presented in this anicle, it is submitted that the Board's ruling and rationale overall are
compatible with and conducive to implementation of what this article concludes is the
task at hand.
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CONCLUSION

"Good Cause" for removal of administrative law judges is
stricter than "efficiency of the service," the standard used for the re
moval of other classified civil service personnel, but not as strict as
"good behavior," the constitutional standard governing removal of
Article III judges. Improper conduct by a judge-soliciting or ac
cepting bribes, for example-would justify removal under all three
standards. Financial stringency leading to reductions in force would
be a typical factor held to satisfy "good cause" and "efficiency of the
service" but which would not comport with the constitutional stan
dard of "good behavior." Failure to follow agency directives in
decisionmaking provides justification for typical removals pursuant
to the "efficiency of the service" standard but is prohibited from use
as "good cause" for removal of administrative law judges.
Failure quantitatively to meet a minimum or to stay within a
maximum average disposition rate could, arguably, provide a rebut
table presumption of good cause, if the rates have been determined
for each agency through consultations with and recommendations by
representative experts from the bench, bar and academia concerned
with that agency's administrative adjudication, and if the agency has
made reasonable effort to accommodate to particular judges' per
ceived and expressed needs for assistance. Resolution 78-2 of the
Administrative Conference suggests the procedural sine qua nons for
establishing quantitative norms. Ruhlen's Manual for administra
tive law judges suggests that thoroughness, clarity and recurrent
rewritting of opinions are judicial assets. The Supreme Court's rul
ings in Ramspeck , Bulz, and Campbell offer reminders, over a period
of 30 years, of esteem for the role, performance and decisional inde
pendence of administrative law judges. The task at hand is to en
hance, not jeopardize, the warrant for esteem through cooperative
formulation of fair and feasible productivity goals, maximization of
assistance to meet the needs of administrative law judges in attaining
and maintaining them, and integration of the judges' findings and
critiques into the agencies' machinery for making and evaluating
policy.

